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With the explosive growth of wireless networking techniques in the last decade,
connecting to the world from any place, at any time and for any body is no longer
just a dream. New concepts of network infrastructures such as mobile ad hoc
networks or dynamic spectrum access networks emerged in recent years to provide
more flexible wireless networking, efficient spectrum usage and robust network con-
nections. With the development of intelligent wireless devices such as cognitive
radios, the network users’ capability has been largely increased. It becomes impor-
tant to analyze and understand the network users’ intelligent behaviors, especially
selfish behaviors. Therefore, we focus our study on these new types of wireless
networks with selfish users, which need to be self-organizing and decentralized.
They are also referred to as autonomous wireless networks.
In order to analyze the selfish behaviors of network users for efficient au-
tonomous wireless networking, we analyze the cooperation in autonomous wire-
less networks under a comprehensive game theoretical framework. Game theory
models strategic interactions among agents using formalized incentive structures.
It not only provides game models for efficient self-enforcing distributed design but
also derives well-defined equilibrium criteria to measure the optimality of game
outcomes for various scenarios.
In this dissertation, we first study the cooperation enforcement in autonomous
wireless networks under noise and imperfect information. We model the interac-
tions among users as multi-stage games and propose a set of belief-assisted ap-
proaches to ensure cooperation by allowing reputation effects or retribution. For
instance, a user in an ad hoc network will forward packets for the others if they
have built up high belief values through their past cooperative behaviors, i.e., for-
warding packets. Further, we investigate the impacts of network dynamics on game
theoretical cooperation stimulation/enforcement in autonomous wireless networks.
We model the dynamic interaction among users as multi-stage dynamic games and
develop various dynamic pricing approaches to stimulate cooperation among users
by using payments as incentives based on auction rules and dynamic programming.
Finally, we exploit the collusive selfish behaviors in autonomous wireless networks
in a non-cooperative game theoretical framework and devise countermeasures to
combat or alleviate collusive behaviors.
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With the explosive growth of wireless networking techniques in the last decade,
connecting to the world from any place, at any time and for any body is no longer
just a dream. The traditional centralized, fixed networks can no longer satisfy
the dramatically increasing demand for wireless services and connections, which
poses imminent challenges on network management and control. New concepts
of network infrastructures emerged in recent years to provide more flexible wire-
less networking, efficient spectrum usage and robust network connections. For
instance, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [1,2] aim to provide wireless services
through multi-hop networking by a set of mobile nodes without requiring central-
ized administration or fixed network infrastructures. In order to fully utilize the
wireless spectrum resources, dynamic spectrum access networks (DSAN) [3–7] al-
lows unlicensed wireless users (secondary users) to dynamically access the licensed
bands from legacy spectrum holders (primary users) on a negotiated or an op-
portunistic basis. Moreover, different from the traditional emergency or military
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situations, these emerging networks are mostly envisioned in civilian applications,
where network users typically do not belong to a single authority and may not
pursue a common goal. Fully cooperative behaviors such as unconditionally for-
warding packets for other users cannot be pre-assumed and the users may tend to
be “selfish”. Therefore, these new types of networks need to be self-organizing and
decentralized, in which the network functions can be run solely by end users. We
refer to such networks as autonomous wireless networks.
Considering the selfishness of network users, before autonomous wireless net-
works can be successfully deployed in practice, the critical issue of cooperation
must be resolved first. Generally speaking, the selfish network users’ objectives are
to maximize their own interests. The users’ cooperative behaviors in wireless net-
works, such as forwarding packets for others or mitigating the interference/collision
to others by keeping silent or lowering their own transmitting power, will usually
harm their own interests. As a result, without sophisticated mechanisms to stimu-
late or enforce cooperation among selfish users, the system performance (through-
put, power consumption or connectivity) of autonomous wireless networks may
be largely deteriorated by the selfish users’ behaviors. Moreover, considering the
node mobility, dynamic topology and unreliable wireless channels, not only the
performance of autonomous networks will be further affected but also it becomes
more difficult to detect the selfish users’ cheating behaviors. Therefore, we need
to analyze the cooperation in autonomous wireless networks based on the selfish
users’ behaviors and further develop efficient and robust cooperation enforcement
approaches to enhance the system performance in various network scenarios.
One of the most important characteristics of autonomous networks is the in-
telligence of selfish network users, which capability becomes even stronger with
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the development of smart wireless devices such as cognitive radios. For instance,
cognitive radios have the potential to provide the users with frequency agility,
adaptive modulation, transmit power control and spectrum sensing ability. It en-
ables them to make intelligent decision on networking behaviors such as packet
forwarding, trust/belief evaluation, or communication parameters such as trans-
mitting power, rate, or operating frequency. Based on the above, different from
traditional centralized networking approaches, it is more natural to study the intel-
ligent behaviors and interactions of selfish users in autonomous wireless networks
from the game theoretical perspective. Generally speaking, game theory [8–10]
models strategic interactions among agents using formalized incentive structures.
It not only provides game models for efficient self-enforcing distributed design
but also derives well-defined equilibrium criteria to study the optimality of game
outcomes for various game scenarios (static or dynamic, complete information or
incomplete information, non-cooperative or cooperative). To be specific, consider-
ing the network dynamics and selfish users, non-cooperative dynamic game theory
is an excellent match to the cooperation study in autonomous wireless networks.
Recently, several schemes have been proposed to enforce or stimulate coopera-
tion in autonomous wireless networks such as MANETs and DSANs [11–29]. These
schemes can be roughly categorized into two types: pricing-based and reputation-
based. In pricing-based methods, such as in [11–16], a selfish node in MANETs
will forward packets for other nodes only if it can get some payment from those
requesters as compensation. As for DSANs, the unused spectrum resources from
legacy spectrum holders can be shared with unlicensed users through auction-based
pricing mechanisms [17–19]. In reputation-based methods, such as in [20–29], a
node determines whether it should interact with others based on their past behav-
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iors, such as forwarding packets for other nodes or request other nodes to forward
packets for it in MANETs, adjusting the transmitting power or time duration in
unused licensed spectrum bands in DSANs. Besides, some efforts have been made
towards mathematical analysis of cooperation in autonomous ad hoc networks us-
ing game theory, such as in [30–38].
Although the cooperation in autonomous wireless networks has been studied in
many existing works and also been analyzed from the game theoretical perspective,
there are still some fundamental issues needed to be exploited in a comprehensive
game theoretical framework. First, most of existing approaches for cooperation
enforcement have assumed perfect observation by network users, and not consid-
ered the effect of noise on the strategy design. However, in autonomous wireless
networks, since central monitoring is in general not available, perfect public ob-
servation is either impossible or too expensive; due to the mobility and wireless
channel variations, the network users’ actions may be disturbed and not correctly
observed even if we assume accurate monitoring of other users. For instance,
when a node has decided to forward a packet for another node, this packet may
still be dropped due to link breakage or transmission errors. Therefore, how to
enforce cooperation in autonomous wireless networks under noise and imperfect
observation still remains unanswered. Second, cooperation in autonomous wireless
networks has been mostly modeled and analyzed in a static way in existing works.
Considering the network dynamics including node mobility, dynamic topology and
wireless traffic variations, the dynamic game theory needs to be further applied to
analyze the cooperation evolvement in long-run scenarios for autonomous wireless
networks. Third, the users’ selfish behaviors have been mostly studied from an
individual point of view. It is worth mentioning that the collusive selfish behaviors
4
are able to largely affect the system performance and will be more difficult to be
detected and combatted. How to formally analyze the cooperation under collusive
situations in a game theoretical framework is another highly important issue.
1.2 Contributions and Thesis Organization
This dissertation focuses on developing a comprehensive game theoretical frame-
work for cooperation in autonomous wireless networks under various network sce-
narios. The contributions lie in the following three aspects.
First, distributive cooperation enforcement have been extensively studied in
a comprehensive game theoretical framework for autonomous wireless networks
under noise and imperfect observation [39–44]. In the autonomous MANETs,
we focus on the most basic networking functionality, namely packet forwarding.
Considering the nodes need to infer the future actions of other nodes based on their
own imperfect observations, in order to optimally quantify the inference process
with noise and imperfect observation, a belief evaluation framework is proposed to
stimulate the cooperation, i.e., packet forwarding between nodes and maximize the
expected payoff of each selfish node by using repeated game theoretical analysis
[39–41]. Further, we not only show that the packet forwarding strategy obtained
from the proposed belief evaluation framework achieves a sequential equilibrium
[10] that no user has incentive to deviate from, but also derive its performance
bounds. In the autonomous DSANs, we model the spectrum sharing as a dynamic
pricing game and develop a belief system to assist selfish users to update their
sharing strategies adaptive to the spectrum dynamics only based on their local
incomplete information [42–44]. The proposed belief-assisted pricing approach not
only can achieve the theoretical optimal outcomes using local information, but also
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will introduce much less overhead than traditional approaches.
Second, we enhance the cooperation in dynamic networking scenarios through
dynamic game theoretical studies [42, 45, 46]. Considering the interactions of net-
work users happen numerous times in autonomous wireless networks, we are able to
stimulate or enforce the cooperation among users based on their past behaviors in
long-run scenarios, which achieves better cooperation than traditional static game
theoretical schemes. We analyze the routing process in autonomous MANETs us-
ing multi-stage dynamic games and propose an optimal pricing-based approach
to dynamically maximize the sender/receiver’s payoff over multiple routing stages
considering the dynamic nature of MANETs, meanwhile, keeping the forwarding
incentives of the relay nodes by optimally pricing their packet-forwarding actions
based on the auction rules [45, 46]. Also, by modeling the spectrum sharing in
DSANs as a dynamic pricing game, we are able to coordinate the spectrum allo-
cation among primary and secondary users through a trading process to maximize
the payoffs of both primary and secondary users adapting to the spectrum dynam-
ics [42].
Third, we study the collusive selfish behaviors in autonomous wireless networks
in a non-cooperative game theoretical framework [47,48]. In order to have efficient
and robust dynamic spectrum sharing, we propose a collusion-resistant dynamic
pricing approach with optimal reserve prices designed to combat and alleviate
the impact of user collusion. Moreover, the belief system that is proposed for
cooperation under noise and imperfect observation can also be extended to combat
collusive behaviors. Note that by using appropriate equilibrium concepts from
game theory, the performance bounds of the networks with collusive users is also
derived in this dissertation.
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The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the related works and game theoretical models for autonomous wireless networks.
The cooperation enforcement in autonomous MANETs under noise and imperfect
observation is presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, an optimal dynamic pric-
ing framework is discussed for self-organized routing in MANETs. In Chapter 5,
the belief-assisted dynamic game theoretical approach is described for dynamic
spectrum allocation in DSANs. Further, the collusion-resistant multi-stage pricing
game is studied for robust dynamic spectrum allocation in Chapter 6. Finally,





2.1.1 Cooperation in Autonomous Ad Hoc Networks
In the literature, many schemes have been proposed to address the issue of co-
operation stimulation in ad hoc networks [11, 13, 20–22, 26]. One way to enforce
cooperation among selfish nodes is to use pricing-based schemes such as [11–13],
in which a selfish node will forward packets for other nodes only if it can get some
payment from those requesters as compensation. For example, a cooperation en-
forcement approach was proposed in [11, 12] by using a virtual currency called
nuglets as payments for packet forwarding, which requires tamper-proof hardware
in each node. Another payment-based system, SPRITE [13], releases the require-
ment of tamper-proof hardware, but requires some online central banking service
trusted by all nodes. Another way to enforce cooperation among selfish nodes
is to use reputation-based schemes with necessary traffic monitoring mechanisms
such as [20–22,26], in which a node determines whether it should forward packets
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for other nodes or request other nodes to forward packets for it based on their
past behaviors. In [20], a reputation-based system was proposed for ad hoc net-
works to mitigate nodes’ misbehaviors, where each node launches a “watchdog”
to monitor its neighbors’ packet forwarding activities. Following [20], CORE and
CONFIDANT systems [21,22] were proposed to enforce cooperation among selfish
nodes which aim at detecting and isolating misbehaving node and thus making it
unattractive to deny cooperation. Moreover, ARCS was proposed in [26] to further
defend against various attacks while providing the incentives for cooperation.
Recently, some efforts have been made towards mathematical analysis of co-
operation in autonomous ad hoc networks using game theory, such as [23, 24, 30–
33, 36, 37]. In [30], Srinivasan et al. provided a mathematical framework for co-
operation in ad hoc networks, which focuses on the energy-efficient aspects of
cooperation. In [31], Michiardi et al. studied the cooperation among selfish nodes
in a cooperative game theoretic framework. In [32], Felegyhazi et al. defined a
game model and identified the conditions under which cooperation strategies can
form an equilibrium. In [33], Altman et al. studied the packet forwarding problem
using a non-cooperative game theoretic framework. Further, Trust modeling and
evaluation framework [23, 24] have been extensively studied to enhance coopera-
tion in autonomous distributed networks, which utilized trust (or belief) metrics
to assist decision-making in autonomous networks through trust recommendation
and propagation. The study of selfish behavior in ad hoc networks using game
theory has also been addressed in [36,37].
Considering the above approaches mostly focus on the basic functionality of
ad hoc networks, namely, packet-forwarding, the cooperation during the routing
process needs to be built upon successful packet forwarding among the nodes and
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is much more complicated than packet forwarding for several reasons. First, the
routing in ad hoc networks involves many selfish nodes at the same time for multi-
hop packet forwarding and the behaviors of the selfish nodes may be correlated.
Moreover, in MANETs, there usually exist multiple possible routes from the source
to the destination. Furthermore, due to mobility, the available routes between the
sources and the destinations may change frequently. In this dissertation, we refer
to path diversity as the fact that in general there exist multiple routes between
a pair of nodes, each with different characteristics, such as the number of hops,
cost (or requested price), and valid time of this route. We refer to time diversity
as the fact that due to the mobility, dynamic topology, and traffic variations, the
routes between two nodes will keep changing over time. In order to achieve efficient
routing in autonomous MANETs, a comprehensive study needs to be carried out
considering the above aspects.
Several approaches have been proposed to exploit the path diversity during the
routing process in autonomous MANETs such as [14–16]. Based on the ideas of
the auction-like pricing and routing protocols for the Internet [49,50], the authors
in [14–16] have introduced some auction-like methods for the cost-efficient and
truthful routing in MANETs, where the sender-centric Vickrey auction has been
adopted to discover the most cost-efficient routes, which has the advantage that
its incentive compatible property ensures the truthful routing among the nodes.
Router-based auction approaches [51], [52] have also been proposed to encourage
the packet-forwarding in MANETs, where each router constitutes an auction mar-
ket instead of submitting bids to the sender. Besides, a strategy-proof pricing
algorithm for the truthful multi-cast routing has been proposed in [53].
10
2.1.2 Cooperation in Autonomous Dynamic Spectrum Ac-
cess Networks
The imbalance between the increasing demands of wireless spectrums and limited
radio resources poses an imminent challenge on efficient spectrum sharing. In or-
der to have efficient dynamic spectrum sharing in autonomous wireless networks,
several difficulties need to be first overcome: unreliable and broadcast nature of
wireless channels, user mobility and dynamic topology, various network infrastruc-
tures, and, most importantly, the network users’ behaviors. Traditional spectrum
sharing approaches only assume cooperative, static and centralized network set-
tings. Before efficient dynamic spectrum sharing can be achieved, the network
users’ intelligent behaviors and interactions have to be thoroughly studied and
analyzed. Game theory studies conflict and cooperation among intelligent ratio-
nal decision makers, which is an excellent match in nature to dynamic spectrum
sharing problems.
The advances of cognitive radio technologies make more efficient and intensive
spectrum access possible on a negotiated or an opportunistic basis. The FCC has
began to consider more flexible and comprehensive use of available spectrum [6,7].
The NeXt Generation program of DARPA also aims to dynamically redistribute
allocated spectrum based on cognitive radio technologies [4,5]. Therefore, great at-
tentions have been drawn to explore the dynamic spectrum access systems [54,55].
Traditionally, network-wide spectrum assignment is carried out by a central server,
namely, spectrum broker [56, 57]. Recently, distributed spectrum allocation ap-
proaches [19,27] have been studied to enable efficient spectrum sharing only based
on local observations. In [19], local bargaining mechanism was introduced to dis-
tributively optimize the efficiency of spectrum allocation and maintain bargaining
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fairness among secondary users. In [27], the authors proposed a repeated game
approach to increase the achievable rate region of spectrum sharing, in which the
spectrum sharing strategy can be enforced by the Nash Equilibrium of dynamic
games. Moreover, efficient spectrum sharing has also been studied from a practical
point of view, such as in [58] and [29], which analyzed spectrum sharing games for
WiFi networks and cellular networks, respectively.
From economical point of view, the deregulation of spectrum use further en-
courages market mechanisms for implementing efficient spectrum allocation in au-
tonomous wireless networks, which requires sophisticated game theoretical study
on the behaviors and interactions of network users. Researchers have already
started to study dynamic spectrum access via pricing and auction mechanisms
[17, 18, 58, 59]. In [17], the authors proposed an auction-based mechanism to ef-
ficiently share spectrum among the users in interference-limited systems. In [58],
the price of anarchy was analyzed for spectrum sharing in WiFi networks. A de-
mand responsive pricing framework was proposed in [59] to maximize the profits
of legacy spectrum operators while considering the users’ response model to the
operators’ pricing strategy. In [18], the authors considered multi-unit sealed-bid
auction for efficient spectrum allocation.
2.2 Game Theoretical Models
Game theory models the interactions among rational, mutually aware players,
where the decisions of some players impacts the payoffs of others. A game consists
of a set of players, a set of moves (or strategies) available to those players, and a
specification of payoffs for each combination of strategies.
The intelligent behaviors of selfish users in autonomous wireless networks can
12
Figure 2.1: Prisoner’s dilemma in strategic form.
be studied using game theoretical models [39, 40, 42, 43, 45–47, 60]. For instance,
in autonomous MANETs, the players are all the network nodes, which may act
as service providers: packets are scheduled to be generated and delivered to cer-
tain destinations; or act as relays: forward packets for other nodes. The strategy
space may include packet forwarding decision, route participation, route selection,
or belief/trust build-up and update. The payoff can be defined considering var-
ious system measurements such as throughput, lifetime or power consumption.
In autonomous DSANs, the players are all the network users including both pri-
mary and secondary users. The strategy space for each user consists of various
actions related to dynamic spectrum sharing. Specifically, for secondary users, the
strategy space includes which licensed channel they will use, what transmission
parameters (such as transmission power or time duration) to be applied, what is
the price they agree to pay for leasing certain channels from the primary users,
etc. For primary users, the strategy space may include which unused channel they
will lease to secondary users and how much they will charge secondary users for
using their spectrum resources, etc. The payoff functions are modeled to measure
each selfish user’s throughput or spectrum efficiency.
There are two ways of representing games: normal form and extensive form
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[8–10]. The normal form (or strategic form) game is usually represented by a
matrix which shows the players, strategies, and payoffs. An example of prisoner’s
dilemma in strategic form can be shown in Figure 2.1. The extensive form can be
used to formalize games with some important order. Games in extensive form are
often presented as trees. Each vertex (or node) represents a point of choice for a
player. The player is specified by a number listed by the vertex. The lines out
of the vertex represent a possible action for that player. The payoffs are usually
specified at the bottom of the tree.
2.2.1 Non-cooperative and Cooperative Games
Considering the availability of centralized authorities, game theoretical study can
be categorized into two types: non-cooperative game and cooperative game. In
non-cooperative games, without centralized control, the selfish network users do
not cooperate so that any cooperation among them must be self-enforcing [9].
Thus, the study on cooperation in autonomous wireless networks matches the sce-
narios of non-cooperative games very well. The non-cooperative game theory pro-
vides us efficient distributed game designs and cooperation stimulation mechanism.
In order to have an efficient autonomous wireless network considering the users’
selfishness, the corresponding algorithm may generally result in a multi-objective
optimization problem. Non-cooperative game theory also equips us well-defined
optimization criteria to measure the optimality in the above scenarios with mul-
tiple agents. To be specific, Nash Equilibrium [9] is an important concept to
measure the outcome of a non-cooperative game, which is a set of strategies, one for
each player, such that no selfish player has incentive to unilaterally change his/her
action. In order to further measure the efficiency of game outcomes, Pareto Op-
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timality [9] is defined such that an outcome of a game is Pareto optimal if there
is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off and at least one
player strictly better off.
In cooperative games, the users are able to make enforceable outcomes through
centralized authorities. Thus, for cooperative games, the interests lie in that how
good the game outcome can be. In other words, how to define and choose the
optimality criteria in cooperative scenarios. Although cooperative game theory
may not directly help us solve the cooperation issue in autonomous wireless net-
works, it is useful to measure the efficiency of the solution that we obtain from
non-cooperative game study on autonomous wireless networks. Further, it is worth
mentioning that Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) [9] plays an important role
in cooperative games, which is a unique Pareto optimal solution to the game mod-
eling bargaining interactions based on six intuitive axioms. To be specific, NBS
divides the remaining spectrum resources among users in a ratio equal to the rate
at which the payoff can be transferred after the users are assigned with the minimal
resources [9]. NBS can be represented as a product of extra resources assigned to
each user, which is also referred to as linear-proportional fairness criterion if no
minimal resources are pre-assigned [61,62].
2.2.2 Repeated Games
In the above example of prisoner’s dilemma, although a better outcome can be
achieved if both prisoners stay silent, the selfishness of each prisoner will lead to
the non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium outcome that both prisoners betray. Thus,
the question rises that how to achieve better game outcomes in non-cooperative
games. Considering that a strategic game may not be played only once, if a
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similar strategic game is played numerous times, the game is called a repeated
game. Unlike a game played once, a repeated game allows for a strategy to be
contingent on past moves, thus allowing for reputation effects and retribution. The
player’s payoff in a repeated game is a discounted summation of her/his payoff at
each stage. One of the most important results in repeated game theory is Folk
Theorem [9], which asserts that for infinite repeated games there exists a discount
factor δ̂ < 1 such that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be enforced
by an equilibrium for any discount factor δ ∈ (δ̂, 1). Thus, by playing a strategic
game many times, more efficient Nash Equilibria can be achieved in a repeated
game framework. Note that in a repeated game, the strategic space needs to be
the same for each player in every stage of the repeated game; otherwise, the game
becomes a general multi-stage game.
In autonomous MANETs, the packet forwarding interactions between the net-
work users can be similarly modeled as repeated games. For instance, it is obvious
that if the packet forwarding interaction between two users happens only once,
both users will have no incentive to forward packets for the other; if the packet
forwarding interaction may happen many times between two users, one user may
tend to help the other to forward packets by considering that the other user may
return the favor in the future for mutual benefits. Based on the above, studying
the user behaviors in autonomous MANETs in a repeated game framework will
enable efficient cooperation among selfish users by reputation effects or retribution.
2.2.3 Dynamic Games
Considering that the cooperation in autonomous wireless networks is a dynamic
process, how the interactions among network users evolve over time based on the
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network dynamics needs to be further studied. Therefore, general dynamic game
models need to be considered to study the strategic game in multi-stage man-
ner or further represent it in extensive form if the users take actions sequentially.
In dynamic games, if complete information is available, i.e., the set of strategies
and payoffs for each user are common knowledge, Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium (SPE) can be used to study the game outcomes, which is an equilibrium
such that users’ strategies constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame [9] of
the original game. If complete information is not available, Sequential Equi-
librium [9] is a well-defined counterpart of SPE under such circumstance, which
guarantees that any deviations from the equilibrium will be unprofitable. More-
over, in non-cooperative games with incomplete information, the players need to
build up certain beliefs of other players’ future possible strategies to assist their
decision making. The concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) [8,10] is
built upon the belief system to measure the game outcomes in the above scenarios.
To be specific, a PBE is a set of strategies and beliefs such that, at any stage of the
game, strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from
equilibrium strategies and observed actions using Bayes’ rule.
2.2.4 Auction Games
Considering the negotiated or leasing-based dynamic spectrum sharing in au-
tonomous DSANs, primary users attempt to sell unused spectrum resources to
secondary users for monetary gains, while secondary users try to acquire spectrum
usage permissions from primary users to achieve certain communication goals,
which generally introduces reward payoffs for them. Noting that the users may be
selfish and won’t reveal their private information unless proper mechanisms have
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been applied to ensure that their interests will not be hurt, the interactions among
users in such scenarios can be modeled as a multi-player non-cooperative game
with incomplete information, which is generally difficult to study as the players do
not know the perfect strategy profile of others. However, based on the above game
settings, the well-developed auction theory [63], one of the most important appli-
cations of game theory, can be applied to formulate and analyze the interactions.
In auction games [63], according to an explicit set of rules, the principles (auc-
tioneers) determine resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the
agents (bidders). In dynamic spectrum sharing games, the primary users can be
viewed as the principles, who attempts to sell the unused channels to the secondary
users. The secondary users are the bidders who compete with each other to buy
the permission of using primary users’ channels. Further, multiple sellers and buy-
ers may coexist, which indicates the double auction scenario. It means that not
only the secondary users but also the primary users need to compete with each
other to make the beneficial transactions possible by eliciting their willingness of
the payments in the forms of bids or asks. In the double auction scenarios of the
DSSG, Competitive Equilibrium (CE) [63] is a well-known theoretical predic-
tion of the outcomes. It is the price at which the number of buyers willing to
buy is equal to the number of sellers willing to sell. As for autonomous MANETs,
considering there may exist multiple possible routes between a source-destination
pair, auction-like pricing-based mechanisms [14–16] can also be introduced for the




Autonomous Ad Hoc Networks
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) have drawn extensive attention in recent years
due to the increasing demands of its potential applications [1, 2]. In traditional
crisis or military situations, the nodes in a MANET usually belong to the same
authority and work in a fully cooperative way of unconditionally forwarding packets
for each other to achieve their common goals. Recently, the MANETs are also
envisioned to be deployed for civilian applications [11, 13, 20–22, 26, 30, 45], where
nodes typically do not belong to a single authority and may not pursue a common
goal. Consequently, fully cooperative behaviors cannot be directly assumed as the
nodes are selfish to maximize their own interests. The cooperation enforcement
becomes important for the above autonomous MANETs.
Although several schemes have been proposed to perform game theoretical anal-
ysis on cooperation in autonomous ad hoc networks as we discuss in Chapter 2,
most of them have assumed perfect observation, and not considered the effect of
noise on the strategy design. In this chapter we study the cooperation enforcement
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for autonomous mobile ad hoc networks under noise and imperfect observation, and
focus on the most basic networking functionality, namely packet forwarding. Con-
sidering the nodes need to infer the future actions of other nodes based on their
own imperfect observations, in order to optimally quantify the inference process
with noise and imperfect observation, a belief evaluation framework is proposed
to stimulate the packet forwarding between nodes and maximize the expected
payoff of each selfish node by using repeated game theoretical analysis. Specifi-
cally, a formal belief system using Bayes’ rule is developed to assign and update
beliefs of other nodes’ continuation strategies for each node based on its private
imperfect information. Further, we not only show that the packet forwarding strat-
egy obtained from the proposed belief evaluation framework achieves a sequential
equilibrium [10] that no user has incentive to deviate from, but also derive its
performance bounds. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed packet
forwarding approach can enforce the cooperation in autonomous ad hoc networks
under noise and imperfect observation with only a small performance degradation
compared to the unconditionally cooperative outcomes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we illus-
trate the system model of autonomous ad hoc networks under noise and imperfect
observation. In Section 3.2, static and repeated packet-forwarding game models
are provided. Vulnerability analysis for autonomous MANETs under noise and
imperfect observation is carried out in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we propose the
belief evaluation framework and carry out the equilibrium and efficiency analysis
for one-hop and multi-node multi-hop packet forwarding. The simulation studies
are provided in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes this chapter.
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3.1 System Model
We consider autonomous ad hoc networks where nodes belong to different author-
ities and have different goals. Assume all nodes are selfish and rational, that is,
their objectives are to maximize their own payoff, not to cause damage to other
nodes. Each node may act as a service provider: packets are scheduled to be gen-
erated and delivered to certain destinations; or act as a relay: forward packets for
other nodes. The sender will get some payoffs if the packets are successfully deliv-
ered to the destination and the forwarding effort of relay nodes will also introduce
certain costs.
In this chapter we assume that some necessary traffic monitoring mechanisms,
such as those described in [13,20,26], will be launched by each node to keep tracking
of its neighbors’ actions. However, it is worth mentioning that we do not assume
any public or perfect observation, where a public observation means that when an
action happens, a group of nodes in the network will have the same observation,
and perfect observation means all actions can be perfectly observed without any
mistake. In ad hoc networks, due to its multi-hop nature and the lack of central
monitoring mechanism, public observation is usually not possible. Meanwhile, to
our best knowledge, there exist no such monitoring mechanisms in ad hoc networks
which can achieve perfect observation. Instead, in this chapter, we study the
cooperation-enforcement strategies based on imperfect private observation. Here,
private means that the observation of each node is only known to itself and won’t
or cannot be revealed to others.
We focus on two scenarios causing imperfect observation in ad hoc networks.
One scenario is that the outcome of a forwarding action may be a packet-drop
due to link breakage or transmission errors. The other scenario is that a node
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Figure 3.1: Packet forwarding in autonomous ad hoc networks under noise and
imperfect observation.
has dropped a packet but is observed as forwarding the packet, which may hap-
pen when the watchdog mechanism [20] is used and the node wants to cheat its
previous node on the route. Figure 3.1 illustrates our system model by showing
a network snapshot of one-hop packet forwarding between two users at a certain
time stage under noise and imperfect observation. In this figure, there are two
source-destination pairs (S1, D1) and (S2, D2). S1 and S2 need to help each other
to forward packets to the destination nodes. At this stage, node S1 drops the
packet and observes the packet-drop signal of node S2’s action, while node S2
forwards the packet and observes the forwarding signal of node S1’s action. The
action and observation of each node are only known to itself and cannot or will not
be revealed to other nodes. Due to transmission errors or link breakage between S2
and D1, S2’s forwarding action is observed as a packet-drop signal; due to possible
cheating behavior between S1 and D2, a forfeit forwarding signal may be observed
by S2. Therefore, it is important to design strategies for each node to make the
optimal decision solely based on these imperfect private information.
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3.2 Packet-Forwarding Game Models
We model the process of routing and packet-forwarding between two nodes forward-
ing packets for each other as a game. The players of the game are two network
nodes, denoted by i ∈ I = {1, 2}. Each player is able to serve as the relay for
the other player and needs the other player to forward packets for him based on
current routing selection and topology. Each player chooses his action, i.e., strat-
egy, ai from the action set A = {F,D}, where F and D are packet forwarding and
dropping actions, respectively. Also, each player observes a private signal ω of the
opponent’s action from the set Ω = {f, d}, where f and d are the observations
of packet forwarding and dropping signals, respectively. Since the player’s obser-
vation cannot be perfect, the forwarding action F of one player may be observed
as d by the other player due to link breakage or transmission errors. We let such
probability be pf . Also, the noncooperation action D may be observed as the
cooperation signal f under certain circumstances. Without loss of generality, let
the observation error probability be pe in our system, which is usually caused by
malicious cheating behaviors and indicates that the group of packets is actually
dropped though forwarding signal f is observed. For each node, the cost of for-
warding a group of packets for the other node during one stage of play is `, and
the gain it can get for the packets that the other node has forwarded for it is g̃.
Usually, the gain of successful transmission is for both the source and destination
nodes. Noting that the source and destination pair in ad hoc networks usually
serves for a common communication goal, we consider the gain goes to the source
for the game modeling without loss of generality.
We first consider the packet forwarding as a static game [8], which is only played
once. Given any action profile a = (a1, a2), we refer to u(a) = (u1(a), u2(a)) as the
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Figure 3.2: Two-player packet forwarding game in strategic form.
expected payoff profile. Let a−i and Prob(ωi|a−i) be the action of the ith player’s
opponent and the probability of observation ωi given a−i, respectively. Then, ui(a)




ũi(ai, ωi, a−i) · Prob(ωi|a−i), (3.1)
where ũi is the ith player’s payoff determined by the action profile and his own ob-
servation. Then, calculating u(a) for different strategy pairs, we have the strategic
form of the static packet forwarding game as a matrix in Figure 3.2. Note that
g = (1− pf ) · g̃, which can be obtained from (3.1) considering the possibility of the
packet-drop.
To analyze the outcome of a static game, the Nash Equilibrium [8, 10] is a
well-known concept, which is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that
no selfish player has incentive to unilaterally change his/her action. Noting that
our two-player packet-forwarding game is similar to the setting of the prisoner’s
dilemma game, the only Nash equilibrium is the action profile a∗ = (D, D), and the
better cooperation payoff outcome (g − `, g − `) of the cooperation action profile
{F, F} cannot be practically realized in the static packet-forwarding game due
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to the greediness of the players. However, generally speaking, the above packet
forwarding game will be played many times in real ad hoc networks. It is natural to
extend the above static game model to a multistage game model [8]. Considering
that the past packet-forwarding behaviors do not influence the feasible actions or
payoff function at current stage, the multistage packet forwarding game can be
further analyzed using the repeated game model [8,10]. Basically, in the repeated
games, the players face the same static game at every period, and the player’s
overall payoff is a weighted average of the payoffs at each stage over time. Let ωti
be the privately observed signal of the ith player in period t. Suppose that the
game begins in period 0 with the null history h0. In this game, a private history
for player i at period t, denoted by hti, is a sequence of player i’s past actions
and signals, i.e., hti = {aτi , ωτi }t−1τ=1. Let H ti = (A × Ω)t be the set of all possible
period-t histories for the ith player. Denote the infinite packet-forwarding repeated
game with imperfect private histories by G(p, δ), where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor and p = (pf , pe). Assume that pf < 1/2 and pe < 1/2. Then, the overall
discounted payoff for player i ∈ I is defined as follows [8].












Folk Theorems for infinite repeated games [8] assert that there exists δ̂ < 1 such
that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be enforced by an equilibrium
for all δ ∈ (δ̂, 1) based on the public information shared by players. However, one
crucial assumption for the Folk Theorems is that players share common information
about each other’s actions. In contrast, the nature of our repeated packet forward-
ing game for autonomous ad hoc networks determines that the nodes’ behaviorial
strategies can only rely on the private information histories including their own
past actions and imperfectly observed signals. Such a minor game-setting change
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from the public observation to the private observation due to noise and imperfect
observation will make a substantial difference in analyzing the efficiency of the
packet-forwarding game. In the situation of imperfect private observation, no re-
cursive structure [64] exists for the forwarding strategies since the player decides
their actions according to various private histories. Each node must conduct sta-
tistical inference to detect potential deviations and estimate what others are going
to do next, which can become extremely complex due to the imperfect observa-
tion [65,66].
3.3 Vulnerability Analysis
In this section, we analyze the vulnerability caused by noise and imperfect obser-
vation in autonomous MANETs. First, we study the system vulnerability in the
scenario of one-hop packet forwarding. Then, we further exploit the effect of noise
and imperfect observation in the scenario of multi-hop packet forwarding.
In the scenario of one-hop packet forwarding, the interactions between a pair
of nodes forwarding packets for each other can be modeled as the two-player game
in the previous section. Although it is seemly a minor game-setting change from
the public observation to the private observation due to noise and imperfect ob-
servation, such change on game-setting introduces substantial challenges on the
interactions, outcomes and efficiency of our packet-forwarding game, which can be
illustrated as follows. First, the noise and observation errors indicate that simple
TIT-for-TAT [33,67] strategies is not able to enforce efficient cooperation paradigm
among users since such equivalent retaliation strategy leads to inefficient nonco-
operative outcomes. Second, considering the selfishness of the users along with
the effects of noise and imperfect observations, the users won’t share their action
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information or observations of others’ actions, which indicates that no public in-
formation available for the users. Therefore, the users are not able to coordinate
their strategies for efficient outcomes relying only on private histories, i.e., no re-
cursive structure [64] exists for the forwarding strategies since the players decide
their actions according to various private histories. Third, although the dynamic
game theory has studied and defined the equilibrium concepts on the outcomes of
the game with imperfect information, such as Sequential Equilibrium (SE) [8, 10]
or Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) [8, 10], it doesn’t provide generalized effi-
cient mechanisms to achieve SE or PBE in the scenarios of private information.
Note that generous tit-for-tat (GTFT) [67] is able to partly alleviate the impact
of noise and imperfect observation on the efficiency of the packet forwarding game
outcomes by assuming that the nodes may be generous to contribute more to the
network than to benefit from it. However, if the constraint of the private infor-
mation is taken into consideration, GTFT cannot work properly. Because, due
to the game-setting of private observation, one user doesn’t know the other user’s
observation of her/his actions and only has the imperfect observation of the other
user’s actions, which leads to the result that efficient TFT cannot be carried out.
Based on the above discussions, the noise and imperfect observation cause sev-
eral vulnerability issues even for simple one-hop packet forwarding in autonomous
MANETs, which can be illustrated as follows.
• Since the nodes make decisions based on private information, Each node must
conduct statistical inference to detect potential deviations and estimate what
others are going to do next. Existence of noise and the constraint of imperfect
observation will result in false alarms or detection errors. Selfish nodes may
be able to utilize such fact to contribute fewer efforts while getting more
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benefits from others.
• Considering that the nodes are not willing to or not able to share their
information, the nodes cannot rely on others’ past experiences or recommen-
dations on the nodes’ behaviors, which gives the selfish nodes more flexibility
on their cheating behaviors.
• With the presence of noise or observation errors, the cooperative nodes may
falsely accuse other cooperative nodes of seemly non-cooperative behaviors,
which is actually caused by link breakage or transmission errors. How to
maintain the cooperative paradigm in such scenarios remains a challenging
problem.
In the scenario of multi-node and multi-hop packet forwarding, more sophis-
ticated vulnerability issues will be raised considering the challenges of the self-
organizing routing and the correlation of the nodes’ actions. In general, due to the
multi-hop nature, when a node wants to send a packet to a certain destination, a
sequence of nodes need to be requested to help forwarding this packet. We refer to
the sequence of (ordered) nodes as a route, the intermediate nodes on a route as
relay nodes, and the procedure to discover a route as route discovery. The routing
process includes route discovery and packet forwarding. The route discovery car-
ries out three steps consecutively. First, the requester notifies the other nodes in
the network that it wants to find a route to a certain destination. Second, other
nodes in the network will make their decisions on whether agreeing to be on the
discovered route or not. Third, the requester will determine which route should be
used. Based on the discussion of the routing process, we can see that the action
and observation of one node on a route will largely affect the behaviors of other
nodes on this route or alternative routes between the source and destination nodes,
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which in reverse affects the the behavior of the original node. The above proper-
ties of multi-node and multi-hop packet forwarding may lead to more vulnerability
issues than one-hop packet forwarding illustrated as follows.
• In the scenarios of multiple nodes on one route, in order to detect or pun-
ish the users with cheating behaviors, the coordination needs to be built
up among multiple nodes to have effective detection or punishment, which
becomes very complicated and requires sophisticated strategy designs con-
sidering only private information available to each node.
• Since the routing process involves different steps, the seemingly cooperative
behaviors at each stage may jointly have cheating effects across multiple
steps. From the game theoretical point of view, each stage game in our
dynamic packet forwarding game consists of several subgames, such as route
participation subgame or route selection subgame. The vulnerability issues
need to be considered not only for each subgame but also for the overall
game.
• The multi-hop routing makes the observation of nodes more difficult as the
packet-drop action at one node will affect the outcome of the multi-hop
routing. Such propagation effects can be taken advantage of by selfish nodes
to cheat for more payoffs.
In order to combat the above vulnerability issues on autonomous MANETs
under noise and imperfect observation, it is important to study novel strategy
framework comprehensively considering these issues.
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3.4 Belief-Based Cooperation Enforcement
In this section, we first develop a belief evaluation framework for two-player packet
forwarding game in attempt to shed light on the solutions to the more complicated
multi-player case. Efficiency study is then carried out to analyze the equilibrium
properties and performance bounds. Further, a belief evaluation framework is pro-
posed for general networking scenarios with multiple nodes and multi-hop routing.
3.4.1 Two-Player Belief-Based Packet Forwarding
In order to have an efficient and robust forwarding strategy based on each node’s
own imperfect observation and actions, enlightened by [66], we propose a belief
evaluation framework to enforce cooperation.
First, we define two strategies, i.e., σF and σD. Let σF be the trigger coopera-
tion strategy, which means that the player forwards packets at current stage, and
at the next stage the player will continue to forward packets only if it observes
the other player’s forwarding signal f . Let σD be the defection strategy, which
means that the player always drops packets regardless of its observation history.
Such strategies are also called continuation strategies [66]. Since both of the two
strategies also determine the player’s following actions at every private history, the
strategy path and expected future payoffs caused by any pair of the two strategies
are fully specified. Let Vα,β(p, δ), α, β ∈ {F, D} denote the repeated game payoff
of σα against σβ, which can be illustrated by the following Bellman equations [68]
for different pairs of continuation strategies.
VFF = (1− δ)(g− `)+ δ((1−pf )2VFF +pf (1−pf )VFD +pf (1−pf )VDF +p2f ·VDD),
(3.3)
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VFD = −(1−δ)`+δ((1−pf )(1−pe)VDD+pf (1−pe)VDD+pe(1−pf )VFD+pfpeVFD),
(3.4)
VDF = (1−δ)g+δ((1−pf )(1−pe)VDD +pe(1−pf )VDF +pf (1−pe)VDD +pepfVDF ),
(3.5)
VDD = (1−δ) ·0+δ((1−pe)2VDD +pe(1−pe)VDD +pe(1−pe)VDD +p2e ·VDD). (3.6)
Note that the first terms on the right hand side (RHS) of the above equations
represent the normalized payoffs of current period, while the second terms illustrate
the expected continuation payoffs considering four possible outcomes due to the
noise and imperfect observation. By solving the above equations, Vα,β(p, δ) can be
obtained as follows.
VFF = (1− δ)(g − `) + δ((1− pf )2VFF +
pf (1− pf )VFD + pf (1− pf )VDF + p2f · VDD), (3.7)
VFD = −(1− δ)` + δ((1− pf )(1− pe)VDD +
pf (1− pe)VDD + pe(1− pf )VFD + pfpeVFD), (3.8)
VDF = (1− δ)g + δ((1− pf )(1− pe)VDD +
pe(1− pf )VDF + pf (1− pe)VDD + pepfVDF ), (3.9)
VDD = (1− δ) · 0 + δ((1− pe)2VDD +
pe(1− pe)VDD + pe(1− pe)VDD + p2e · VDD). (3.10)
Then, we have VDD > VFD, for any δ, p. Furthermore, if δ > δ0, then VFF > VDF ,
where δ0 can be obtained as
δ0 =
`
(1− pf − pe)g − [pf (1− pf )− pe]`. (3.11)
Suppose that player i believes that his opponent is playing either σF or σD, and is
playing σF with probability µ. Then the difference between his payoff of playing
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σF and the payoff of playing σD is given by
4V (µ; δ, p) = µ · (VFF − VDF )− (1− µ) · (VDD − VFD). (3.12)
Hence 4V (µ) is increasing and linear in µ and there is a unique value π(p, δ) to
make it zero, which can be obtained as follows.
π(δ, p) =
−VFD(δ, p)
VFF (δ, p)− VDF (δ, p)− VFD(δ, p) , (3.13)
where π(p, δ) is defined so that there is no difference for player i to play σF or
σD when player j plays σF with probability π(δ, p) and σD with probability 1 −
π(δ, p). For simplicity, π(δ, p) may be denoted as π under the circumstances with
no confusion. In general, if node i holds the belief that the other node will help
him to forward the packets with a probability smaller than 1/2, node i is inclined
not to forward packets for the other node. Considering such situation, we let δ be
such that π(δ, p) > 1/2.
It is worth mentioning that equation (3.12) is applicable to any period. Thus,
if a node’s belief of an opponent’s continuation strategy being σF is µ, in order to
maximize its expected continuation payoff, the node prefers σF to σD if µ > π and
prefers σD to σF if µ < π. Starting with any initial belief µ, the ith player’s new
belief when he takes action ai and receives signal ωi can be defined using Bayes’
rule [8] as follows.
µ(ht−1i , (F, f)) =
µ(ht−1i )(1− pf )2
µ(ht−1i )(1− pf ) + pe · (1− µ(ht−1i ))
, (3.14)
µ(ht−1i , (F, d)) =
µ(ht−1i )(1− pf ) · pf
µ(ht−1i ) · pf + (1− pe) · (1− µ(ht−1i ))
, (3.15)
µ(ht−1i , (D, f)) =
µ(ht−1i )(1− pf ) · pe
µ(ht−1i ) · (1− pf ) + pe · (1− µ(ht−1i ))
, (3.16)
µ(ht−1i , (D, d)) =
µ(ht−1i )pf · pe
µ(ht−1i ) · pf + (1− pe) · (1− µ(ht−1i ))
. (3.17)
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Table 3.1: Two-Player Packet Forwarding Algorithm
1. Initialize using system parameter configuration (δ, pe, pf ):
Node i initializes his belief µ1i of the other node as π(δ, p)
and chooses the forwarding action in period 1.
2. Belief update based on the private history:
Update each node’s belief µt−1i into µ
t
i using (3.14-3.17) according to
different realizations of private history.
3. Optimal Decision of the player’s next move:
If the continuation belief µti > π, node i plays σF ;
If the continuation belief µti < π, node i plays σD;
If the continuation belief µti = π, node i plays either σF or σD.
4. Iteration:
Let t = t + 1, then go back to Step 2.
From on the above discussion, we propose a two-player packet forwarding algorithm
based on the developed belief evaluation framework in Table 3.1. Note that by
using the proposed belief system, each node only needs to maintain its belief value,
its most recent observation and action instead of the long-run history information
of interactions with other users.
3.4.2 Efficiency Analysis
In this part, we show that the behaviorial strategy obtained from the proposed al-
gorithm with well-defined belief system is a sequential equilibrium [10] and further
analyze its performance bounds.
First, we briefly introduce the equilibrium concepts of the repeated games with
imperfect information. As for the infinitely repeated game with perfect infor-
mation, the Nash Equilibrium concept is a useful concept for analyzing the game
outcomes. Further, in the same scenario with perfect information, Subgame Per-
fect Equilibrium (SPE) [10] can be used to study the game outcomes, which is
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an equilibrium such that users’ strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every
subgame [8] of the original game, which eliminate those Nash Equilibria in which
the players’ threats are incredible. However, the above equilibrium criteria for the
infinitely repeated game require that perfect information can be obtained for each
player. In our packet forwarding game, each node is only able to have its own
strategy history and form the beliefs of other nodes’ future actions through im-
perfect observation. Sequential Equilibrium [10] is a well-defined counterpart
of subgame perfect equilibrium for multi-stage games with imperfect information,
which has not only sequential rationality that guarantees that any deviations will
be unprofitable but also consistency on zero-probability histories.
In our packet-forwarding game with private history and observation, the pro-
posed strategy with belief-system can be denoted as (σ∗, µ), where µ = {µi}i∈I
and σ∗ = {σ∗i }i∈I . By studying (3.14), we find that there exists a point φ such
that µ(ht−1i , (F, f)) < µ(h
t−1
i ) as µ(h
t−1
i ) > φ while µ(h
t−1
i , (F, f)) > µ(h
t−1
i ) as
µ(ht−1i ) < φ. Here, φ can be calculated as φ = [(1 − pf )2 − pe]/(1 − pf − pe).
It is easy to show that µ(ht−1i , (ai, ωi)) < µ(h
t−1
i ) when (F, d), (D, f) and (D, d)
are reached. Since we initialize the belief with π we have µti ≤ φ after any belief-
updating operation if π < φ. Considering the belief updating in the scenario that
π ≥ φ becomes trivial, we assume π < φ thus µti ∈ [0, φ] and φ ≥ 1/2. Then,
let the proposed packet-forwarding strategy profile σ∗ be defined as: σ∗i (µi) = σF
if µi > π and σ
∗
i (µi) = σD if µi < π; if µi = π, the node forwards packets with
probability π and drops them with probability 1− π. Noting that π(δ, p) ≤ φ, we
obtain another constraint on δ, which can be written as follows.
δ ≥ δ = `
[(1− pf )2 − pe] · g + ` · pe . (3.18)
Using the above equilibrium criteria for the repeated games with imperfect in-
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formation, we then analyze the properties of the proposed strategy illustrated in
Table 3.1 through the following theorems.
Theorem 3.4.1 The proposed strategy profile σ∗ with belief-system µ from Table
3.1 is a sequential equilibrium for π ∈ (1/2, φ).
Proof See the appendix at the end of this chapter.
Theorem 3.4.2 shows that the strategy profile σ∗ and the belief system µ ob-
tained from the proposed algorithm is a sequential equilibrium, which not only
responds optimally at every history but also has consistency on zero-probability
histories. Thus, the cooperation can be enforced using our proposed algorithm
since the deviation will not increase the players’ payoffs. Then, similar to [66], it
is straightforward to prove the following theorem, which addresses the efficiency of
the equilibrium and shows that when the pe and pf are small enough, our proposed
strategy approaches the cooperative payoff g − `.
Theorem 3.4.2 Given g and `, there exist δ̃ ∈ (0, 1) and p̃ for any small positive
τ such that the average payoff of the proposed strategy σ∗ in the packet-forwarding
repeated game G(p, δ) is greater than g − `− τ if δ > δ̃ and pe, pf < p̃.
However, in real ad hoc networks, considering the mobility of the node, channel
fading and the cheating behaviors of the nodes, it may be not practical to assume
very small pe and pf values. A more useful and important measurement is the
performance bounds of the proposed strategy given some fixed pe and pf values.
We further develop the following theorem studying the lower bound and upper
bound of our strategy to provide a performance guideline. In order to model
the prevalent data application in current ad hoc networks, we assume the game
discount factor is very close to 1.
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Theorem 3.4.3 Given the fixed (pe, pf ) and discount factor of the repeated game
δG close to 1, the payoff of the proposed algorithm in Table 3.1 is upper bounded
by
Ū = (1− κ) · (g − `), (3.19)
where
κ =
pf · [g(1− pf ) + `]
(1− pf − pe)(g − `) . (3.20)
The lower bound of the performance will approach the upper bound when the dis-
count factor of the repeated game δG approaches 1 and the packet forwarding game
is divided into N sub-games as follows: the first sub-game is played in period
1, N +1, 2N +1, ... and the second sub-game is played in period 2, N +2, 2N +2, ...,
and so on. The optimal N is
N = blog δ/ log δGc, (3.21)
The proposed strategy is played in each sub-game with equivalent discount factor
δNG .
Proof By substituting Vα,β obtained from (3.7)-(3.10) into (3.13), we have
π(δ, p) =
`
g − ` ·
1− δ(1− pf )2
δ(1− pf − pe) . (3.22)
Then, since the node i is indifferent of forwarding or dropping packets if its belief
of the other node is equal to π, the expected payoff of the node i at the sequential
equilibrium (σ∗, µ) can be written as
V (π, δ, p) = π(δ, p) · VDF (δ, p) + (1− π(δ, p)) · VDD(δ, p). (3.23)
It is easy to show that V (π(δ, p), δ, p) is a decreasing function in δ when δ ∈ (0, 1).
Then, the upper bound of the expected payoff can be obtained by letting δ be the
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smallest feasible value. From (3.11) and (3.18), we have δ > δ and δ > δ0. Since
δ > δ0, we can derive the upper bound of the payoff of the proposed algorithm as
(3.19) by substituting δ into (3.23).
However, the discount factor of our game is usually close to 1. Generally, δ is
a relatively smaller value in the range of (0, 1). In order to emulate the optimal
discount factor δ, we introduce the following game partition method. We partition
the original repeated game G(p, δG) into N distinct sub-games as the theorem
illustrates. Each sub-game can be regarded as a repeated game with the discount
factor δNG . The optimal sub-game number N , which minimizes the gap between
δNG and δ, can be calculated as N = blog δ/ log δGc.
As there is always difference between δNG and δ, it is more important to study
the maximal gap, which results in the lower bound of the payoff using our game
partition method. Similar to [69], we can show that by using the optimal N ,
δNG ∈ [δ, δ̄], where δ̄ = δ/δG. Substituting δ̄ into (3.23), we have the lower bound
of the payoff of our proposed algorithm with the proposed game partition method.
When δG approaches 1, and δ̄ approaches δ, the payoff of our algorithm achieves
the payoff upper-bound.
In the above theorem, the idea of dividing the original game into some sub-
games is useful to maintain the efficiency when δ approaches one for our game
setting. A larger δ indicates that future payoffs are more important for the total
payoff, which results in more number of sub-games. Since there are multiple sub-
games using the belief-based forwarding strategy, even if the outcomes of some
sub-games become the non-cooperation case due to the observation errors and
noise, cooperation plays can still continue in other sub-games to increase the total
payoff.
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3.4.3 Multi-Node Multi-Hop Packet Forwarding
In the previous parts, we mainly focus on the two-player case, while in an ad hoc
network there usually exist many nodes and multi-hop routing is generally enabled.
In this section, we model the interactions among selfish nodes in an autonomous
ad hoc network as a multi-player packet forwarding game, and develop the optimal
belief evaluation framework based on the two-player belief system.
Multi-Node Multi-Hop Game Model
In this section, we consider autonomous ad hoc networks where nodes can move
freely inside a certain area. For each node, packets are scheduled to be generated
and sent to certain destinations. Different from the two-player packet forwarding
game, the multi-player packet forwarding game studies multi-hop packet forward-
ing which involves the interactions and beliefs of all the nodes on the route. Before
studying the belief-based packet forwarding in this scenario, we first model the
multi-player packet forwarding game as follows:
• There are M players in the game, which represent M nodes in the network.
Denote the player set as IM = {1, 2, ...,M}.
• For each player i ∈ IM , he has groups of packets to be delivered to certain
destinations. The payoff of successfully having a group of packets delivered
during one stage is denoted by g̃.
• For each player i ∈ IM , forwarding a group of packets for another player will
incur the cost `.
• Due to the multi-hop nature of ad hoc networks, the destination player may
be not in the sender i’s direct transmission range. Player i needs to not only
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find the possible routes leading to the destination (i.e., route discovery),
but also choose an optimal route from multiple routing candidates to help
forwarding the packets (i.e., route selection).
• Each player only knows his own past actions and imperfect observation of
other players’ actions. Note that the information history consisting of the
above two parts is private to each player.
Similar to [30], we assume the network operates in discrete time. In each time slot,
one node is randomly selected from the M nodes as the sender. The probability
that the sender finds r possible routes is given by qr(r) and the probability that
each route needs h̄ hops is given by qh̄(h̄) (assume at lease one hop is required in
each time slot). Note that the h̄ relays on each route are selected from the rest
of nodes with equal probability and h̄ ≤ bg̃/`c. Assume each routing session lasts
for one slot and the routes remain unchanged within each time slot. In our study,
we consider that delicate traffic monitoring mechanisms such as receipt-submission
approaches [13] are in place, hence the sender is able to have the observation of
each node on the forwarding route.
Belief Evaluation System Design
In this part, we develop an efficient belief evaluation framework for multi-hop
packet forwarding games based on the proposed two-player approach. Since a
successful packet transmission through a multi-hop route depends on the actions
of all the nodes on the route, the belief evaluation system needs to consider the
observation error caused by each node, which makes a direct design of the belief
system for the multi-player case very difficult. However, the proposed two-player
algorithm can be applied to solve the multi-player packet forwarding problem by
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considering the multi-node multi-hop game as many two-player games between the
source and each relay node. Let Rti denote the set of players on the forwarding
route of player i in tth period. Let µi,j denote the sender i’s belief value of the
node j on the route. The proposed forwarding strategy for the multi-player case
is illustrated as follows.
Belief-based Multi-hop Packet Forwarding (BMPF) Strategy: In the
multi-node multi-hop packet forwarding game, given the discount factor δG and
p = (pe, pf ), the sender and relay nodes act as follows during different phases of
routing process.
• Game partition and belief initialization: Partition the original game into N
sub-games according to (3.21). Then, each node initializes its belief of other
nodes as π(δNG , p) and forwards packets with probability π(δ
N
G , p).
• Route participation: The selected relay node on each route participates in
the routing if and only if its beliefs of the sender and other forwarding nodes
are greater than π.
• Route selection: The sender selects the route with the largest µi = Πj∈Riµij
with µij > π from the route candidates.
• Packet forwarding: The sender updates its belief of each relay node’s contin-
uation strategy using (3.14)-(3.17) and decides the following actions based
on its belief.
In the above strategy, the belief value of each node plays an important role. The
nodes who intentionally drop packets will be gradually isolated by other nodes since
the nodes who have low belief value of the misbehaved nodes will not cooperate
with them or participate in the possible routes involving these nodes. With the
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help of route participation and selection stage, our strategy successfully simplifies
the complicated multi-node multi-hop packet forwarding game into multiple two-
player games between the sender and relay nodes. But, the equivalent two-player
gain g here is different from that in Table 3.1, which needs to further cope with the
error propagation and routing diversity depending on the routing statistics such as
qr(r) and qh̄(h̄). Note that the roles of sender or relay nodes may change over time
depending on which source-destination pair has packets to transmit. As each node
is selfish and trying to maximize its own payoff, all nodes are inclined to follow
the above strategy for achieving the optimal payoff. In order to formally show the
cooperation enforcement, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.4 The packet forwarding strategy and belief evaluation system spec-
ified by the BMPF Strategy lead to a sequential equilibrium for the multi-player
packet forwarding game.
Proof A sequential equilibrium for the game with imperfect information is not
only sequential rational but also consistent [10]. First, we prove the sequential
rationality of the proposed strategy using the one-step deviation property [10],
which indicates that (σ, µ) is sequentially rational if and only if no player i has a
history hi at which a change in σi(hi) increases his expected payoff.
In route participation stage, we assume each forwarding node j ∈ Ri has built
up a belief value of the sender i as µji and the belief values of any other relay
node k ∈ Ri. One-step deviation property is considered for the following three
subcases for any forwarding node j: First, if µji > π and µjk > π, k 6= j, a one-
step deviation is not to participate in the routing. In this case, the forwarding
node will miss the opportunity of cooperating with the sender, which has been
shown to be profitable for the forwarding node in (3.12). Second, if µji < π and
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µjk > π, k 6= j, a one-step deviation is to participate in the routing. Since the
relay node j will drop the packet from the sender i, the equivalent cooperation
gain g in Table 3.1 will decrease due to packet-drop of the participated nodes,
which also decreases the future gain of node j. Although node j does not afford
the cost to forward packets for node i, its future gain will be damaged due to a
smaller g. Thus, one-step deviation is not profitable in this subcase. Third, if
µji < π and there exists node k such that µjk < π, the noncooperation forwarding
behavior may happen since node j’s belief of node k is lower than the threshold
π. Such possible noncooperation outcome may decrease the expected equivalent
gain g, which results in future payoff loss as (3.19) shows. Therefore, in all of the
above three subcases of the route participation stage, one-step deviation from the
BMPF Strategy cannot increase the payoffs of the nodes.
In route selection stage, two subcases need to be considered for one-step de-
viation test. First, if the largest µi with µij < π, ∃j is selected as the forwarding
route, there are noncooperation interactions between the sender i and relay j,
which decreases the expected equivalent gain g and then lower the future payoffs.
Second, if not the route with largest µi is selected, the expected gain g can still
be increased by another route with larger successful forwarding probability. Thus,
one-step deviation is not profitable in the route selection stage.
Further, Theorem 3.4.2 can be directly applied here to prove the sequential
rationality for every packet-forwarding stage. To sum up, the BMPF Strategy
is sequential rational for the multi-node multi-hop packet-forwarding game. Be-
sides, following the definition of the consistency for sequential equilibria [10], it
is straightforward to prove it for our BMPF Strategy. Therefore, the proposed
multi-player packet-forwarding strategy is a sequential equilibrium.
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Since the above theorem has proved that the BMPF Strategy is a sequential
equilibrium, the cooperation among the nodes can be enforced and no selfish node
will deviate from the equilibrium. As all nodes will follow the proposed strategy
to have optimal payoffs, the expected gain g in Table 3.1 can be written as follows.
g = g̃ · Er,h̄[1− [1− (π(1− pf ))h̄]r]− E(h̄) · π`, (3.24)
where E(h̄) is the expected number of hops and Er,h̄ represents the expectation
with respect to the random variables r and h̄. The first term on the RHS of (3.24) is
the expected gain of the sender considering multiple hops and possible routes; the
second term on the RHS is the expected forwarding cost of sender i for returning
the forwarding favor of the other relay nodes on its route. Note that π in (3.24)
is also affected by g as shown in (3.22), which makes the computation of g more
complicated. However, as we show in Theorem 3.4.2, the optimal π approaches φ
when δ approaches δ. Considering the situations when δG approaches 1, π can be
very close to φ as δ is approached. Then, we can approximate g by substituting π
with φ in (3.24), which is only determined by pf and pe.
3.5 Simulation Studies
In this section, we investigate the cooperation enforcement results of our proposed
belief-based approach by simulation.
We first focus our simulation studies on one-hop packet forwarding scenarios
in ad hoc networks, where the two-player belief-based packet forwarding approach
can be directly applied to. Let M = 100, g = 1 and ` = 0.2 in our simulation.
In each time slot, any one of the nodes is picked with equal probability as the
relay node for the sender. For comparison, we define the cooperative strategy, in
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Figure 3.3: The average payoffs of the cooperative strategy and proposed strategy.
which we assume every node will unconditionally forward packets with no regard
to other nodes’ past behaviors. Such cooperative strategy is not implementable
in autonomous ad hoc networks. But it can serve as a loose performance upper
bound of the proposed strategy to measure the performance loss due to noise and
imperfect observation.
Figure 3.3 shows the average payoff and performance bounds of the proposed
strategy based on our belief evaluation framework for different pf by comparing
them with the cooperative payoff. Note that pe = 0.01 and δG = 0.99. It can
be seen from Figure 3.3 that our proposed approach can enforce cooperation with
only small performance loss compared to the unconditionally cooperative payoff.
Further, this figure shows that the average payoff of our proposed strategy satisfies
the theoretical payoff bounds developed in Theorem 3.4.2. The fluctuation of the
payoff curve of our strategy is because only integer number of sub-games can be
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Figure 3.4: Payoff ratios of the proposed strategy to the cooperative strategy.
partitioned into from the original game. Figure 3.4 shows the ratio of the payoffs
of our strategy to those of the cooperative strategy for different pe and pf . Here
we let δG = 0.999 to approach the payoff upper bound. It can be seen from
Figure 3.4 that even if pf is as large as 0.1 due to link breakage or transmission
errors, our cooperation enforcement strategy can still achieve as high as 80% of
the cooperative payoff.
In order to show that the proposed strategy is cheat-proof among selfish users,
we define the deviation strategies for comparison. The deviation strategies differ
from the proposed strategy only when the continuation strategy σF and observa-
tion F are reached. The deviation strategies will play σD with some deviating
probability pd instead of playing σF as the proposed belief evaluation framework.
Figure 3.5 compares the nodes’ average payoffs of the proposed strategy, coopera-
tive strategy and deviation strategies with different deviating probabilities. Note
that δG = 0.999 and pe = 0.1. This figure shows that the proposed strategy has
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much better payoffs than the deviating strategies.
Then, we study the performance of the proposed multi-hop multi-node packet
forwarding approach. Before evaluating the performance of our proposed strat-
egy, we first need to obtain the routing statistics such as qr(r) and qh̄(h̄). An
autonomous ad hoc network is simulated with M nodes randomly deployed inside
a rectangular region of 10γ × 10γ according to the 2-dimension uniform distribu-
tion. The maximal transmission range is γ = 100m for each node, and each node
moves according to the random waypoint model [70]. Let the “thinking time”
of the model be the time duration of each routing stage. Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (DSR) [70] is used as the underlying routing to discover possible routes. Let
λ = Mπ/100 denote the normalized node density, i.e., the average number of
neighbors for each node in the network. Note that each source-destination pair is
formed by randomly picking two nodes in the network. Moreover, multiple routes
with different number of hops may exist for each source-destination pair. Since the
routes with the minimum number of hops achieve the lowest costs, without loss of
generality, we only consider the minimum-hop routes as the routing candidates.
In order to study the routing statistics, we first conduct simulations to study
the hop number on the minimum-hop route for source-destination pairs. Let
hmin(ni, nj) = ddist(ni, nj)/γe denote the ideal minimum number of hops needed
to traverse from node i to node j, where dist(ni, nj) denotes the physical distance
between node i and j, and let ˜̄h(ni, nj) denote the number of hops on the actual
minimum-hop route between the two nodes. Note that we simulate 106 samples of
topologies to study the dynamics of the routing in ad hoc networks. Firstly, Figure
3.6 shows the approximated cumulative probability mass function (CMF) of the
difference between the ˜̄h(ni, nj) and hmin(ni, nj) for different node densities. Based
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Figure 3.5: Payoff comparison of the proposed strategy and deviating strategies.
Figure 3.6: The cumulative probability mass function of the hop-number difference
between the ˜̄h(ni, nj) and hmin(ni, nj).
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on these results, the average number of hops associated to the minimum-hop route
from node i to j can be approximated using the dist(ni, nj), γ, and the correspond-
ing CMF of hop difference, which also gives the statistics of qh̄(h̄). Besides, it can
be seen from Figure 3.6 that lower node density results in having a larger number of
hops for the minimum-hop routes, since the neighbor nodes are limited for packet
forwarding in such scenarios. Secondly, we study the path diversity of the ad hoc
networks by finding the maximum number of minimum-hop routes for the source-
destination pair. Note that there may exist the scenarios where the node may
be on multiple minimum-hop forwarding routes for the same source-destination
pair. For simplicity, we assume during the route discovery phase, the destination
randomly picks one of such routes as the routing candidate and feedbacks the
routing information of all node-disjoint minimum-hop routes to the source. Figure
3.7 shows the CMF of the number of the minimum-hop routes for different hop
number when the node density is 30. This figure actually shows the qr(r) statistics
when the ideal minimum hop number is given. Based on the routing statistics
given in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7, we are able to obtain the expected equivalent
two-player payoff table for multi-node and multi-hop packet forwarding scenarios
using (3.24).
We compare the payoff of our approach with that of the cooperative one in
Figure 3.8. Note that multi-hop forwarding will incur more costs to the nodes
since one successful packet delivery involves the packet forwarding efforts of many
relay nodes. Also, the noise and imperfect observation will have more impact on the
performance as each node’s incorrect observation will affect the payoffs of all other
nodes on the selected route. We can see from Figure 3.8 that our proposed strategy
maintains high payoffs even when the environment is noisy and the observation
48
Figure 3.7: The cumulative probability mass function of the number the minimum-
hop route when the node density is 30.
Figure 3.8: Average payoffs of the proposed strategy in multi-node multi-hop sce-
narios.
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error is large. For instance, when pe = 0.2 and pf = 0.1, our proposed strategy
still achieves over 70% payoffs of the unconditionally cooperative payoff.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we study the cooperation enforcement in autonomous ad hoc net-
works under noise and imperfect observation. By modeling the packet forward-
ing as a repeated game with imperfect information, we develop the belief evalua-
tion framework for packet forwarding to enforce cooperation in the scenarios with
noise and imperfect observation. We show that the behaviorial strategy with well-
defined belief system in our proposed approach not only achieves the sequential
equilibrium, but also maintains high payoffs for both two-player and multi-player
cases. Notice that only each node’s action history and imperfect private observa-
tion are required for the proposed strategy. The simulation results illustrate that
the proposed belief-based cooperation enforcement approach achieves stable and
near-optimal equilibria in ad hoc networks under noise and imperfect observation.
3.7 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.4.2
First, we prove the sequential rationality of the solution obtained by our algorithm.
It is already shown in [10] that (σ, µ) is sequentially rational if and only if no player
i has a history at which a change in σi(hi) increases his expected payoff. This is
also called the one-step deviation property for sequential equilibrium, which we
use in our proof to show the sequential rational property of the proposed solution.
There are three possible outcomes considering the relation between µ and π.
1) If µi(h
t−1
i ) > π, a one-step deviation from σ
∗ is to drop packets in current
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period and continue with σ∗ in the next period. Since the action player i chooses
is D, the operators (3.16) and (3.17) need to be considered for updating beliefs.
Noting that µi(h
t−1
i , (D, f)) is an increasing function with respect to µ(h
t−1
i ) and
µ(ht−1i ) ≤ 1, we can obtain that µi(ht−1i , (D, f)) < pe. Since π > 1/2 and pe < 1/2,
we have the continuation belief satisfying µi(h
t−1
i , (D, f)) < π. Then only the
following two sub-cases need to be considered.
(i) Suppose µi(h
t−1
i , (D, d)) ≤ π. In this case, since µi(ht−1i , (D, d)) ≤ π and
µi(h
t−1
i , (D, f)) ≤ π, the one-step deviation results in the continuation strategy
σD. Considering the node’s current action D, the deviated node will play σD in
this sub-case. But, (3.12) shows that the rational node prefers σF than σD when
µi(h
t−1




i , (D, d)) > π. The one-step deviation is to drop packets in
current period and continue with σD if the history information set (D, f) is reached
or continue with σF if (D, d) is reached. Compared with the first sub-case, we find
that the one-step deviation differs from σD only when the information set (D, d)
is reached. Let 4V̂ (µ) be the payoff difference between the proposed solution and
the one-step deviation, which can be written as
4V̂i(µt−1i ) = 4Vi(µt−1i )− δ[µt−1i · pf + (1− pe) · (1− µt−1i )] · 4Vi(µ(ht−1i , (D, d))),
(3.25)
where the first term on the RHS is the payoff difference between σF and σD, and the
second term on the RHS is the conditional payoff difference when (D, d) is reached.
Noting that (3.17) indicates µi(h
t−1
i , (D, d)) < µi(h
t−1
i ) and 4V (µ) is an increasing
function in µ. we have 4Vi(µi(ht−1i )) > 4Vi(µi(ht−1i , (D, d))). Moreover, as the
coefficient of the second term in (3.25) is less than one, 4V̂i(µi(ht−1i )) is strictly
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greater than zero. Thus, the one-step deviation is not profitable in this sub-case.
Since there is no sub-cases other than the above ones, we show that if µi(h
t−1
i ) >
π, the one-step deviation cannot increase the payoff for the node.
2) If µi(h
t−1
i ) < π, a one-step deviation from σ
∗ is to forward packets in cur-
rent period and continue with σ∗ in the next period. Considering π < φ and
µi(h
t−1
i , (F, d)) is an increasing function in µi(h
t−1
i ), we can show that µi(h
t−1
i , (F, d)) <
1/2 if µi(h
t−1
i ) < π, thus µi(h
t−1
i , (F, d)) < π. Then, there are two sub-cases:
(i) If µi(h
t−1
i , (F, f)) ≥ π, the one-step deviation from σ∗ becomes playing the
cooperation strategy σF . As we have shown in (3.12), σD is preferable to σF if
µi(h
t−1
i ) < π.
(ii) If µi(h
t−1
i , (F, f)) < π, the deviated strategy differs from σF only when
the private history (F, f) is reached. Let 4Ṽ (µi(ht−1i )) be the payoff difference
between the equilibrium strategy σD and the one-step deviation strategy, which
can be obtained as
4Ṽ (µi(ht−1i )) = 4V (µi(ht−1i ))−δ[µi(ht−1i )(1−pf )+pe·(1−µi(ht−1i ))]·4V (µi(ht−1i ), (F, f)).
(3.26)
Note that 4V (µi(ht−1i )) < 4V (µi(ht−1i ), (F, f)). considering µi(ht−1i , (F, f)) >
µi(h
t−1
i ). As the coefficient of the second term on the RHS in (3.26) is less than
one, we have a positive 4Ṽ (µi(ht−1i )), which shows that the one-step deviation in
this subcase cannot increase payoff.
3) If µi(h
t−1
i ) = π the node is indifferent between forwarding packets and drop-
ping packets from (3.12). Obviously, a one-step deviation will not change the
expected payoff.
By studying the above three cases, we prove that the proposed strategy (σ∗, π)
of the packet forwarding game is sequential rational when π ∈ (1/2, φ).
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Then, we prove the consistency of the proposed strategy. Since the proposed
strategy is a pure strategy when µi 6= π we construct a completely mixed strategy
(σεi , µ
ε
i), which is constructed by allowing a tremble with a small probability ε
from purely forwarding strategy or dropping strategy. By applying (3.14)-(3.17)
to calculate the belief-update system with tremble, it is easy to show that µεi
converges to µi when ε approaches zero. Therefore, given a sequence ε̄ = (εn)
∞
n=1







with completely mixed strategies converges to the proposed strategy (σ∗, µ) while
the belief system being updated by Bayes’ rule.
Therefore, since the proposed strategy satisfies the sequential rationality and
consistency properties when π ∈ (1/2, φ), it is a sequential equilibrium for the
packet-forwarding game with imperfect private observation.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Dynamic Pricing for
Autonomous Ad Hoc Networks
In this chapter, we study the cooperation among selfish users during the routing
process in autonomous ad hoc networks, which is built upon the cooperation of
the packet forwarding among users and requires more sophisticated mechanisms
to stimulate cooperation while more network users are involved for efficient self-
organized routing.
Although the existing pricing-based approaches [14–16] have achieved some
success in cost-efficient and incentive-compatible routing for MANETs with selfish
users, most of them assume that the network topology is fixed or the routes between
the sources and the destinations are known and pre-determined. Further, none
of the existing approaches have addressed how to exploit the time diversity for
efficient routing. In order to encourage cooperation among selfish users and achieve
optimal pricing-based routing, both path diversity and time diversity of MANETs
should be exploited. Specifically, the source (here we assume the source pays
to the forwarding nodes) is responsible for exploiting the path diversity, such as
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introducing competition among the multiple available routes through auction, to
minimize the payment needed at the current stage. Each node also needs to exploit
the time diversity to maximize its overall payoff over time. In each stage the source
adaptively decides the number of packets being transmitted according to the price
it needs to pay, which is determined by the current routing conditions. For instance,
when the routing conditions are good (i.e., the cost to transmit a packet is low),
more packets should be transmitted in the current stage; otherwise, less or no
packets should be transmitted in the current stage.
In this chapter, we consider the routing process as multi-stage dynamic games
and propose an optimal pricing-based approach to dynamically maximize the
sender/receiver’s payoff over multiple routing stages considering the dynamic na-
ture of MANETs, meanwhile, keeping the forwarding incentives of the relay nodes
by optimally pricing their packet-forwarding actions based on the auction rules.
The main contribution of this chapter are multi-fold: First, by modeling the
pricing-based routing as a dynamic game, the senders are able to exploit the time
diversity in MANETs to increase their payoffs by adaptively allocating the packets
to be transmitted into different stages. Considering the mobility of the nodes, the
possible routes for each source-destination pair are changing dynamically over time.
According to the path diversity, the sender will pay a lower price for transmitting
packets when there are more potential routes. Thus, the criterion for allocation
can be developed based on the fact that the sender prefers to send more packets
in the stage with lower costs. Second, an optimal dynamic programming approach
is proposed to implement efficient multi-stage pricing for autonomous MANETs.
Specifically, the Bellman equation is used to formulate and analyze the above dy-
namic programming problem by considering the optimization goal in terms of two
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parts: current payoffs and future opportunity payoffs. A simple allocation algo-
rithm is developed and its optimality is proved based on the auction structure and
routing dynamics. Third, the path diversity of MANETs is exploited using the
optimal auction mechanism in each stage. The application of the optimal auc-
tion [71] makes it possible to separately study the optimal allocation problem and
the mechanism design of the auction protocol based on the well-known Revenue
Equivalence Theorem [71], which simplifies the dynamic algorithm while keeping
the optimality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The system model of
autonomous MANETs are illustrated in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we formulate
the pricing process as dynamic games based on the system model. In Section
4.3, the optimal dynamic auction framework is proposed for the optimal pricing
and allocation of the multi-stage packet transmission. In Section 4.4, extensive
simulations are conducted to study the performance of the proposed approach.
Finally, summary is given in Section 4.5.
4.1 System Description
We consider autonomous mobile ad hoc networks where nodes belong to differ-
ent authorities and have different goals. We assume that each node is equipped
with a battery with limited power supply, can freely move inside a certain area,
and communicates with other nodes through wireless connections. For each node,
packets are scheduled to be generated and delivered to certain destinations with
each packet having a specific delay constraint, that is, if a packet cannot reach the
destination within its delay constraint, it will become useless.
In our system model, we assume all nodes are selfish and rational, that is, their
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objectives are to maximize their own payoff, not to cause damage to other nodes.
However, node are allowed to cheat whenever they believe cheating behaviors can
help them increasing their payoff. Since nodes are selfish and forwarding packets
on behalf of others will incur some cost, without necessary compensation, nodes
have no incentive to forward packets for others. In our system model, we assume
that if a packet can be successfully delivered to its destination, then the source
and/or the destination of the packet can get some benefits, and when a node
forwards packets for others, it will ask for some compensation, such as virtual
money or credits [12, 13], from the requesters to at least cover its cost. In our
system model, to simplify our illustration, we assume that the source of a packet
pays to the intermediate nodes who have forwarded the packet for it. However,
the proposed schemes can also be easily extended to handle the situation that the
destinations pay. Like in [13], we assume that there exist some bank-like centralized
management points, whose only function is to handle the billing information, such
as performing credit transfer among nodes based on the submitted information
by these nodes. Each node only needs to contact these central banking points
periodically or aperiodically.
In general, due to the multi-hop nature of ad hoc networks, when a node wants
to send a packet to a certain destination, a sequence of nodes need to be requested
to help forwarding this packet. We refer to the sequence of (ordered) nodes as a
route, the intermediate nodes on a route as relay nodes, and the procedure to dis-
cover a route as route discovery. The routing protocols are important for MANETs
to establish communication sessions between each source-destination pair. Here,
we consider the on-demand (or reactive) routing protocols for ad hoc networks, in
which a node attempts to establish a route to some destination only when it needs
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to send packets to that destination. Since on-demand routing protocols are able to
handle many changes of node connectivity due to the node’s mobility, they perform
better than periodic (or proactive) routing protocols in many situations [72–74] by
having much lower overheads. In MANETs, due to the mobility, nodes need to fre-
quently perform route discovery. In this chapter, we refer to the interval between
two consecutive route discovery procedures as a routing stage, and assume that for
each source-destination pair, the selected route between them will keep unchanged
in the same routing stage. Furthermore, to simplify our analysis, we assume that
for each source-destination pair, the discovered routes in different routing stages
are independent.
After performing route discovery in each stage, multiple forwarding routes can
be exploited between the source and the destination. Assume there are ` possible
routes and let vi,j be the forwarding cost of the jth node on the ith route, which is
also referred to as the node type in this chapter. Considering possible node mobility
in MANET, ` and vi,j are no longer fixed values, which can be modelled as random
variables. Let the probability mass function (PMF) of ` be f̃(`) and the corre-
sponding cumulative density function (CMF) be F̃ (`). And, vi,j is characterized
by its probability density function (PDF) f̂i,j and the cumulative density function
(CDF) F̂i,j. Define the cost vector of the ith route as vi = {vi,1, vi,2, ..., vi,hi},
where hi is the number of forwarding nodes on the ith route. Thus, we have the
total cost on the ith route ri =
∑hi
j=1 vi,j, which is also a random variable. Let the
PDF and CDF of ri be fi and Fi, respectively.
Figure 4.1 illustrates our system model by showing a network snapshot of
pricing-based multi-hop routing between a source-destination pair. It can be seen
from this figure that there are three routing candidates with different number
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of hops and routing costs (such as energy-related forwarding costs) between the
source-destination pair. Each route will bid as one entity for providing the packet
forwarding service for the source-destination pair at this routing stage. Then, the
source will choose the route with the lowest bid to transmit the packets. The price
that the source pays to the selected route may be equivalent to the asked price or
include a premium than the true forwarding cost. Note that the asking prices from
each route and the payment from the source may vary according to the applied
pricing mechanisms. Further, the payment that the source provides to the selected
route needs to be shared among the nodes on the selected route in a way that no
node on the selected route has incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
Considering the network dynamics due to the node mobility, dynamic topology or
channel fading, the number of available routes, the number of required hops and
the forwarding costs will change over time. In Figure 4.2, we consider a dynamic
scenario and illustrate the relationship of the number of packets to be transmitted
and the lowest cost of the available routes at each stage. In order to maximize its
payoff by utilizing the time diversity, the source tends to transmit more packets
when the cost is lower and transmit less packets when the cost is higher. The
optimal relationship between them will be derived in later sections.
4.2 Pricing Game Models
In this chapter, we model the process of establishing a route between a source and
a destination node as a game. The players of the game are the network nodes.
With respect to a given communication session, any node can play only one of
the following roles: sender, relay node, or destination. In autonomous MANET,
each node’s objective is to maximize its own benefits. Specifically, from the sender’s
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Figure 4.1: Pricing-based routing in autonomous MANETs.
Figure 4.2: Dynamic pricing-based routing considering time diversity.
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point of view, he/she aims to transmit its packets with the least possible payments;
from the relaying nodes’ points of view, they want to earn the payment which not
only covers their forwarding cost but also gain as much extra payment as possible;
while from the network designers’ point of view, they prefer that the network
throughput and/or lifetime can be maximized. Therefore, the source-destination
pair and the nodes on the possible forwarding routes construct a non-cooperative
pricing game [8]. Since the selfish nodes belong to different authorities, the nodes
only have the information about themselves and will not reveal their own types
to others unless efficient mechanisms have been applied to guarantee that truth-
telling does not harm their interests. Generally, such non-cooperation game with
imperfect information is complex and difficult to study as the players do not know
the perfect strategy profile of others. But based on our game setting, the well-
developed auction theory can be applied to analyze and formulate the pricing
game.
The auction games belong to a special class of game with incomplete informa-
tion known as games of mechanism design, in which there is a “principal” who
would like to condition his actions on some information that is privately known
by the other players, called “agents”. In auction, according to an explicit set of
rules, the principle (auctioneer) determines resource allocation and prices on the
basis of bids from the agents (bidders). In the pricing game, the source can be
viewed as the principle, who attempts to buy the forwarding services from the
candidates of the forwarding routes. The possible forwarding routes are the bid-
ders who compete with each other for serving the source node, by which they may
gain extra payments for future use. In order to maximize their own interests, the
selfish forwarding nodes will not reveal their private information, i.e., the actual
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forwarding costs, to others. They compete for the forwarding request by eliciting
their willingness of the payments in the forms of bids. Thus, because of the path
diversity of MANET, the sender is able to lower its forwarding payment by the
competition among the routing candidates based on the auction rules. It is impor-
tant to note that instead of considering each node as a bidder [14,15], we consider
each route as a bidder in this chapter, which has the following advantages: First,
by considering the nodes on the same forwarding route as one entity, the sender can
fully exploit the path diversity to maximize its own payoffs. Second, since it has
been proved in [14] that there does not exist a forwarding-dominant protocol for
ad hoc pricing games, the route-based bidding approach makes it possible to study
the payoff-maximization allocation and cheat-proof mechanism design sequentially.
Moreover, less bidding information is required for route-based approach.
In this section, we first consider the static pricing game (SPG), which is only
played once for the fixed topology. Then, the dynamic pricing game (DPG) is
studied and formulated considering playing the pricing game for multiple stages.
4.2.1 The Static Pricing Game
In this subsection, we study the static pricing game model. By taking advantage of
the auction approach, our goal is to maximize the profits of the source-destination
communication pair for transmitting packets while keeping the forwarding incen-
tives of the forwarding routes. Specifically, considering an auction mechanism
(Q,M) consists of a pair of functions Q : D → P and M : D → RN , where D is
the set of announced bids, P is the set of probability distributions over the set of
routes L. Note that Qi(d) is the probability that the ith route candidate will be se-
lected for forwarding and Mi(d) is the expected payment for the ith route, where
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d is the vector of bidding strategies for all routes, i.e., d = {d1, d2, .., d`} ∈ D.
Then, the payoff function of the ith forwarding route can be represented as follows
Ui(di, d−i) = Mi(di, d−i)−Qi(di, d−i) · ri. (4.1)
Before studying the equilibria of the auction game, we first define the direct reve-
lation mechanism as the mechanism in which each route bids its true cost, di = ri.
The Revelation Principle [71] states that given any feasible auction mechanism,
there exists an equivalent feasible direct revelation mechanism which gives to
the auctioneer and all bidders the same expected payoffs as in the given mech-
anism. Thus, we can replace the bids d by the cost vector of the routes, i.e.,
r = {r1, r2, ..., rL} without changing the outcome and the allocation rule of the
auction game. Therefore, the equilibrium of the SPG can be obtained by solving
the following optimization problem to maximize the sender’s payoff while providing















s.t. Ui(ri, d−i) ≥ Ui(di, d−i),∀di ∈ D (4.3)




where the constraint (4.3) is also referred as the incentive compatibility (IC) con-
straint, which ensures the users to report their true types, and g is the marginal
profit of transmitting one packet.
4.2.2 The Dynamic Pricing Game
Considering the dynamic nature of MANET, the network topology may change
over time due to the mobility of the nodes. Thus, the route discovery needs to
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be performed frequently. Moreover, for different routing stages, there may exist
different number of available routes with different number of hops. It is important
for each source-destination pair to decide the transmission and payment behaviors
for each stage according to the route conditions. Therefore, the pricing game under
such dynamic situation can no longer be modelled as static games. Game theorists
use the concept of dynamic games to model such multi-stage games and analyze
the long-run behaviors of players. In dynamic games, the strategies of the players
not only depend on the opponents’ current strategies but also the past outcomes
of the game and the future possible actions of other players. Our pricing game for
MANET falls exactly into the category of dynamic games. In this chapter, we will
focus on studying the dynamic pricing game.
Intuitively, the sender prefers to transmit more packets when more routing
candidates are available and the number of hops is small. Because, considering the
application of auction protocols in each stage, the sender has a higher probability to
get the service with a lower price when there are more bidders (routes) with lower
type values. Moreover, the practical constraints in MANET need to be considered
in DPG, such as the delay constraint of packet transmission or the bandwidth
constraint of the maximal number of packets being able to be transmitted within
an unit time duration. Therefore, in order to maximize their profits, the source-
destination pair needs not only to optimally allocate the packets to the routes
within one time period but also to schedule the packets for all periods. In our
DPG, it is important to note that the optimal packet transmission strategy for
each source-destination pair is affected by both the past plays and the future
possible outcomes. Generally speaking, the packet transmission decision is made
by comparing the current transmission profit and future opportunity profits. Also,
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due to the delay and bandwidth constraints, the past transmission plays affect
current decision-making. Capturing the dynamics becomes the key to the optimal
solution of our DPG. Let `t denote any realization of the route number at the tth
stage and r be a realization of the types of all routing candidates. Consider a
T -period dynamic game, the overall payoff maximization problem for the source-
















s.t. Ui,t(ri,t, d−i,t) ≥ Ui,t(di,t, d−i,t), ∀di,t ∈ D







kt = M. (4.4)
where kt is the number of packets transmitted in the tth stage and Kt is the vector
of the numbers of the transmitted packets in the first T −t+1 stages, which can be
represented as Kt = {kT , kT−1, ..., kt}. Note that a smaller t in this chapter stands
for a later time stage. Here, G(Kt) is the profit that the sender gains in the tth
stage, which may not only depend on how many packets are transmitted in current
stage, i.e., kt, but also be affected by how many packets have been transmitted in
previous stages, Kt+1. Considering the rate-distortion theory [75], we assume the
profit function is concave in kt. For example, the marginal profit of transmitting
one more packet when a lot of packets have already been transmitted should be
limited. Also, β is the discount factor for multistage games, and the subscript t
indicates the tth routing stage. Note that T and B are the delay constraint and
the bandwidth constraint, respectively. M is the total number of packets to be
transmitted within T stages.
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The above DPG formulation (4.4) extends the optimal pricing problem to the
time dimension, which can exploit the potential of time diversity in the autonomous
ad hoc network considering its dynamic nature. However, directly solving the
nonlinear integer programming problem is very difficult. Because, not only does
the current routing realization affect the allocation decision, but also the past play
and allocation decision influence the feasible actions and payoff functions in the
current period.
4.3 Optimal Dynamic Pricing-Based Routing
In order to achieve efficient self-organized routing in the DPG considering the dy-
namic nature of MANETs, we propose the optimal pricing-based routing approach
in this section. First, the optimal auction mechanism is considered for maximizing
the payoffs for the source-destination pair while keeping the forwarding incentives
of the relaying nodes. Then, the dynamic multi-stage game is further formu-
lated using the optimal auction and dynamic programming approach. Finally, the
mechanism design and the profit-sharing among the nodes on the selected route
are considered for the proposed approach.
4.3.1 Optimal Auction for Static Pricing-Based Routing
In Section 4.2, we have formulated the static pricing game based on the auction
principles as the optimization problem (4.2). Here, we further utilize the results
of the optimal auction [76] to simplify the optimization problem. From [76], we
know that by considering the optimal auction, the sender’s expected total payoff
can be expressed only in terms of the allocation Q, which is independent of the
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payment to each route candidate. Specifically, the optimization problem (4.2) can



















where J(ri) = ri +1/ρ(ri), and ρ(ri) = fi(ri)/Fi(ri) is the hazard rate [76] function
associated with the distribution of the routing cost. Note that J(ri) is also called
the virtual type of the ith player. It’s proved in [76] that the solution of the above
optimization also satisfies the incentive compatible constraint. The assumptions
for the above formulation are rather general: (1) F is continuous and strictly
increasing, (2) the allocations Qi(ri, r−i) are increasing in ri. From (4.5) and
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, it follows that all mechanisms that result in
the same allocations Q for each realization of r yield the same expected payoff.
Thus, in order to obtain the optimal pricing strategies, the mechanism design
process proceeds in two steps: First, find the optimal allocation Q(r); second,
find an implementable mechanism that produces Q for each realization r. By
using the optimal auction approach for pricing, the payoff-maximized allocation
for the sender is to choose the route with the minimal virtual type J(ri) when
g − J(ri) ≥ 0, otherwise the sender will not transmit the packet as it will cause
negative payoff and violate his individual rationality. Therefore, if we assume J(v)
is strictly increasing in v, we can define v∗ = maxv{(g−J(v)) = 0} as the reserved
price for the sender, which is the largest payment he/she can offer for transmitting
a packet. Note that the distributions that have increasing J(v) include the uniform,
normal, logistic, exponential distributions, etc.
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Based on the above discussion, we find that the static pricing game is not
efficient if the current routing realization shows a high cost. Considering the dy-
namic properties of MANET, a more efficient pricing mechanism can be achieved
by studying it as a multistage game and optimally allocating the packet transmis-
sions over multiple time periods.
4.3.2 Optimal Dynamic Auction for Dynamic Pricing-Based
Routing
Considering the optimal auction results in the DPG model formulated in Section
4.2, we further propose the optimal dynamic auction framework for pricing in au-
tonomous MANET. As it is difficult to directly solve (4.4), we study the dynamic
programming approach in our proposed framework to simplify the multistage op-
timization problem.
Define the value function Vt(x) as the maximum expected profit obtainable
from periods t, t− 1, ..., 1 given that there are x packets to be transmitted within
the constraint of time periods. Simplifying (4.4) using the Bellman equation, we














+ β · Vt−1(x− kt)
}]
, (4.6)
s.t. Qi(r) ∈ {0, 1},
`t∑
i=1
Qi(r) = 1, kt ≤ B.
Moreover, the boundary conditions for the above dynamic programming problem
are
V0(x) = 0, x = 1, ..., M, (4.7)
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Recall that we have the delay constraint T of the maximal allowed time stages and
the bandwidth constraint B of the maximal number of packets able to be trans-
mitted for each stage. Based on the principle of optimality in [68], an allocation Q
that achieves the maximum in (4.6) given x, t and r is also the optimal solution for
the overall optimization problem (4.4). Note that the above formulation is similar
to that of the multi-unit sequential auction [77] studied by the economists.
First, note that from (4.6) and the monotonicity of J(·), it is clear that if the
sender transmits k packets within one time period, these packets should be all






















0 if k = 0,
G(k,Kt+1)− k · J(r(1)) if k > 0,
(4.9)
where r(1) means the lowest cost of the forwarding routes. Thus, the dynamic





{Rt(kt) + β · Vt−1(x− kt)}
]
, (4.10)
which is also subject to (4.7). Let k∗t (x) denote the optimal solution above, which
is the optimal number of packets to be transmitted on the winning route at the
tth stage given remaining capacity x. Letting 4Rt(i) ≡ Rt(i) − Rt(i − 1) and







[4Rt(i)− β · 4Vt−1(x− i + 1)]
}]
+ β · Vt−1(x).
(4.11)
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The above formulation will help us to simplify the optimal dynamic pricing prob-
lem.
Then, in order to solve the dynamic pricing problem (4.6)-(4.7), we need to
first introduce the following lemmas based on (4.11).
Lemma 4.3.1 If 4Vt−1(x) ≥ 4Vt−1(x + 1), then k∗t (x) ≤ k∗t (x + 1) ≤ k∗t (x) +
1,∀x ≥ 0.
Proof We study the left hand side (LHS) inequality first. If k∗t (x) = 0, the
inequality holds true. If k∗t (x) > 0 and considering the assumption 4Vt−1(x) ≥
4Vt−1(x+1), the optimal allocation k∗t (x+1) may be higher due to the additional
packet in queue. Hence, k∗t (x + 1) ≥ k∗t (x).
As for the right hand side (RHS) inequality, we prove it by contradiction.
Assume k∗t (x + 1) ≥ k∗t (x) + 2. From (4.9), we know that R(k) is decreasing in
its argument. Further, from (4.11) and the assumption of this lemma 4Vt−1(x) ≥
4Vt−1(x + 1), we obtain that achieving the optimal k for the tth stage in (4.11) is
equivalent to finding the maximal k satisfying the following inequality
4Rt(k) > β · 4Vt−1(x− k + 1). (4.12)
Therefore, given the optimal k∗t (x + 1), we have
4Rt(m) > β · 4Vt−1(x + 1−m + 1), for m = 1, 2, ..., k∗t (x + 1). (4.13)
As we assume k∗t (x+1) ≥ k∗t (x)+2 and letting m = k∗t (x)+2 in (4.13), we obtain
4Rt(k∗t (x) + 2) > β · 4Vt−1(x + 1− (k∗t (x) + 2) + 1)
= β · 4Vt−1(x− (k∗t (x) + 1) + 1). (4.14)
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Since R(k) is decreasing in k, (4.14) can be further written as
4Rt(k∗t (x) + 1) ≥ 4Rt(k∗t (x) + 2)
> β · 4Vt−1(x− (k∗t (x) + 1) + 1). (4.15)
Considering the optimality criterion of k∗t (x) in (4.12), k
∗
t (x) should be the largest
number of packets satisfying (4.12). Therefore, (4.15) contradicts the optimality
of k∗t (x). The RHS inequality is proved.
It can be seen from the proof of Lemma 4.3.2 that the optimal allocation of
packet transmission over multiple stages can also be determined under the condi-
tion 4Vt−1(x) ≥ 4Vt−1(x + 1). Then, we will prove the above condition holds for
all t in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.2 4Vt(x) is decreasing in x for any fixed t and is increasing in t for
any fixed x.
Proof See the Appendix at the end of this chapter. The idea of
this lemma can also be illustrated in an intuitive way as follows. At any fixed time
period, the marginal benefit 4Vt(x) of each additional packet declines because
the future possible routes are limited; therefore, the chance of transmitting the
additional packet at low prices also decreases. Similarly, for any given remaining
packet number x, the marginal benefit of an additional packet increases with t,
because more number of possible future routes are available when more remaining
time periods; therefore, the chance of getting a higher marginal benefit goes up.
Also, Lemma 4.3.2 relaxes the assumption of Lemma 4.3.2 and we always have
k∗t (x) ≤ k∗t (x + 1) ≤ k∗t (x) + 1,∀x ≥ 0.
Considering Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.2, the optimal allocation of packet
transmission for the proposed dynamic auction framework can be characterized by
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the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.3 For any realization (`t, r) at the tth stage, the optimal number of





max{1 ≤ k ≤ min{x,B} : 4Rt(k) > β · 4Vt−1(x− k + 1)}
if Rt(1) > β · 4Vt−1(x);
0 otherwise.
(4.16)
Moreover, it is optimal to allocate these k∗t (x) packets to the route with the lowest
cost ri.
Proof Vt(x) is the summation of two terms in (4.11). As the second term is
fixed given x, the optimal k∗t maximizing the first term needs to be studied. Based
on the definition (4.9), 4R(·) is decreasing in its argument. Also, 4Vt−1(·) is
decreasing in its argument from Lemma 4.3.2. Thus, 4R(k)−β ·4Vt−1(x−k +1)
is also monotonically decreasing in k. Therefore, the optimal allocation at tth time
period with x packets in queue, k∗t (x), is the largest k for which this difference is
positive.
Theorem 4.3.2 shows how the source node should allocate packets into different
time periods. The basic idea is to progressively allocate the packets to the route
with the smallest realization of J(r(1)) until the marginal benefit 4Rt(i) drops
below the marginal opportunity cost 4Vt−1(x− i + 1).
In order to have the optimal allocation strategies using Theorem 4.3.2, we first
need to know the expected profit function 4Vt(x),∀t, x. For finite number of time
periods, T , in problem (4.6), the optimal dynamic programming proceeds backward
using the Bellman equation [68] to obtain 4Vt(x). Due to the randomness of the
route number and its type, it is difficult to obtain the close-form expression of
4Vt(x). Thus, we use simulation to approximate the values of 4Vt(x) for different
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t and x, which proceeds as follows: Start from the routing stage 0. For each stage
t, generate N samples of the number of available routes and their types, which
follow the PDF f`(`) and fi(ri), respectively. For each realization and for each
pair of values (x, t), calculate k∗t (x) using Theorem 4.3.2. By using the conclusion
of Lemma 4.3.2, we simplify the computation of k∗t (x) and only need O(NM)
operations to calculate Vt(x) for all x at fixed t time period. Therefore, O(NMT )
operations are required for the whole algorithm. Note that the computation of
Vt(x) can be done off-line, which will not increase the complexity of finding the
optimal allocation for each realization.
We then study the expected profit function for infinite number of routing stages.
Such scenario gives the upper-bound of the expected profit, because the source
node can wait until low-cost routes being available for transmission. For infinite
horizon, the maximal profit Vt(x) in (4.6) can be rewritten as







(G(K)− k · J(ri))Qi(r) + β · V ∗(x− k)
}]
(4.17)
or, equivalently, V ∗ = T V ∗, where T is the operator updating V ∗ using (4.17).
Assuming S is the feasible set of states, The convergence proposition of the dynamic
programming algorithm [68] states that: for any bounded function V : S → R,
the optimal profit function satisfies V ∗(x) = limp→∞(T pV )(x), ∀x ∈ S. As V (x)
is bounded in our algorithm, we are able to apply the value iteration method to
approximate the optimal V (x), which proceeds as follows: Start from some initial
function for V (x) as V 0(x) = g(x), where the superscript stands for the iteration
number. Then, iteratively update V (x) by letting V p+1(x) = (T V p)(x). The
iteration process ends until |V p+1(x) − V p(x)| ≤ ε, for all x, where ε is the error
bound for V ∗(x).
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4.3.3 Mechanism Design
In the previous part, we have developed the optimal dynamic pricing-based routing
approach. Next, our task is to find auction mechanisms that achieve the derived
optimal strategy. Many auction forms can be applied to achieve the optimal strat-
egy. Considering the truth-telling property of the second-price auction, we focus
on this mechanism in our chapter.
In a traditional second-price auction, the bidder with the highest bid wins the
item and pays the second highest bid for it. In our framework, the source node
is trying to find the route with the lowest cost, which implies the application of
reverse second-price auction. The source node allocates the packet transmission
to the route with the lowest payment bid and actually pay the second-lowest bid
to the selected route. Moreover, the auction mechanism can be performed in
many forms, such as open auctions and sealed-bid auctions. Open auctions allows
the bidders to submit bids many times until finally only one bidder stays in the
game. In sealed-bid auctions, the bidders only submit their bids once. Considering
the sealed-bid auctions require less side-information and hence save the wireless
resources, we analyze the sealed-bid second-price auction for our optimal allocation
policy.
It is important to note that the straightforward application of the reverse
second-price auction can not guarantee the truth-telling property of the bidders.
Let J̃t(r) = G(1,Kt+1)− J(r) and r̃t = J̃−1t (4Vt−1(xt)), where xt is the packets to
be transmitted from the tth stage. Considering the scenario where the lowest cost
of the routes rt(1) > r̃t, it can be seen from Theorem 4.3.2 that no packet will be
assigned for forwarding within current time period. Hence, the route with the low-
est cost may have incentive to bid below their true cost and satisfy the threshold
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constraint. In this way, this route will win the packet and get positive payoff as
the sender awards it the second lowest bid. But the expected profit of the sender
will decrease according to (4.11). Therefore, we need to modify the second-price
mechanism by using r̃t as the reserved price for every stage, which is the highest
price that the sender agrees to pay for transmitting one packet within current time
period. Specifically, given the submitted bid vector, dt = {d1,t, d2,t, ..., d`,t}, the
sender allocates the packet to the route with lowest bid below the reserved price
and the selected route gets the payment max{d(2), r̃}, where d(2) is the second
lowest type of the forwarding routes.
Note that the mechanism we developed above can prevent the single route from
not reporting the true cost. But in the presence of collusion of the routes, it may
be not able to maintain the truth-telling property. This problem can be fixed
from two aspects: First, the greediness of the selfish routes can help to prevent
the collusion. Assume two routes collude to increase their profits. The collusion
requires the two routes to act and share the extra gain cooperatively. But, the
greediness of the routes decide that the cooperative game can not be carried out
between them. The noncooperative behaviors will eventually lead to an inefficient
outcome and break the collusion of the players. Second, in our scheme, the sender
can discourage the collusion among the routes by setting a higher reserve price.
The collusion behaviors of bidders is also referred as the bidding ring in the context
of the auction theory. The optimal reserve price is analyzed in [71] to combat the
collusion of bidders, which can be directly applied to our scheme for handling the
route collusion.
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4.3.4 Profit Sharing among the Nodes on a Selected Route
In the above sections, we have developed the optimal dynamic routing approach
through multi-stage pricing in MANETs and designed the mechanism of the second-
price auction with reserved prices to assure the truth-telling property of each route.
But, we consider each route as an entity. Thus, the residual problem is that how to
share the forwarding profits of the route defined as in (4.1) among the forwarding
nodes on the route. Although the proposed mechanism can ensure the truth-telling
of each route as one bidder, the cooperation among the nodes on one route can not
be pre-assumed and truth-telling mechanisms need to be further designed for the
profit-sharing problem. In this part, we will first prove that no dominant truth-
telling strategy exists for each node on the selected multi-hop forwarding route in
static profit-sharing scenarios. Then, the truth-telling profit-sharing mechanisms
are designed to enforce the cooperation among the nodes on the selected route in
dynamic scenarios.
As the nodes on the same forwarding route belong to their own authorities,
they will act greedily to get more profits from the total profits that the route
gains, which forms a static profit-sharing game (SPSG). The players in the profit-
sharing game are all the nodes on the same forwarding route. The payoff of each
node is defined as the profits it obtained through packet forwarding efforts, which
is represented as Pi,j for the jth node on the ith route. The action strategy of the
jth node on the ith discovered route can be represented as {αi,j, v̂i,j}, where αi,j
is the the percentage of profits that this node will get for its packet forwarding
efforts and v̂i,j is the forwarding cost that it reported while performing the route-
based pricing. Note that v̂i,j may not be the true forwarding cost and our aim is
to design mechanisms to enforce the truth-telling behaviors. Assume the number
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of hops on the ith route is hi. Let the profit-sharing vector for the ith route be
αi = {αi,1, αi,2, ..., αi,hi}, where
∑hi
j=1 αi,j = 1. Denote the reported cost vector of
the nodes on the ith route as v̂i = {v̂i,1, v̂i,2, ..., v̂i,hi}. Recall that the type vector of
the nodes on the ith route is defined as vi = {vi,1, vi,2, ..., vi,hi} and the PDF of vi is
f̂i, which we assume to be identical for all nodes without loss of generality. Then,
we study the existence of the dominant truth-telling strategies in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.3.4 There exists no dominant truth-telling strategy {αi, v̂i} in the
static profit-sharing game.
Proof We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assume α∗i is a dominant truth-
telling profit-sharing strategy in the static profit-sharing game, which means by
using α∗i , every forwarding node’s dominant strategy on the ith route is to report its
true type (or cost). Equivalently, if the jth node reports a higher cost, v̂i,j = vi,j+ε,
than its true type vi,j while other nodes report the true value, the jth node will
get a lower profit. In order to show the dominant strategy α∗i , we need to calculate
and compare the node’s profit when it is cheating or not. First, the total profits
of the ith route are obtained and then we study the profit of each node. Based
on our second-price mechanism and considering (4.1), the total profits of the ith
route can be represented as follows.
Ui(r̂i) = Prob(r̂i < r(1)(r−i)) · (Er−i [r(1)(r−i)|r̂i < r(1)(r−i)]− r̂i), (4.18)
where r̂i is the bidding cost of the ith route, which the ith route believes to be the
true cost, but may be not if some node on the ith route is cheating by reporting a
higher type value, and r(1)(r−i) represents the lowest cost of all routes except the
ith route. Without loss of generality, we assume the PDF of ri to be identical for
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all routes as f . By using the results of order statistics [78], we have the condition
expectation of the payment as follows.





[1− F (x)]`−1dx. (4.19)
Noting that the probability of winning the auction for the ith route is
Prob(r̂i < r(1)(r−i)) = [1− F (r̂i)]`−1. (4.20)




[1− F (x)]`−1dx. (4.21)
Then, using the profit-sharing strategy α∗i , the profit of the jth node on the ith
route can be calculated. We consider two cases: (a) the node reports the true type
vi,j; (b) the node cheats and reports a higher value v̂ = vi,j + ε. For case (a), the







[1− F (x)]`−1dx. (4.22)
For case (b), the profit includes the cheating profit of reporting an extra cost ε and
the allocated profit from the ith route, which can be written as
Ui,j(v̂i,j) = ε · Prob(r̂i < r(1)(r−i)) + α∗i,j · Ui(r̂i)
= ε · [1− F (ri + ε)]`−1 + α∗i,j ·
∫ ∞
ri+ε
[1− F (x)]`−1dx. (4.23)
Subtracting (4.22) from (4.23), we have















[1− F (ri + ε)]`−1dx = ε ·
(
[1− F (ri + λε)]
[1− F (ri + ε)]
)`−1
. (4.25)
And, for simplicity, let
Ψ(ε) =
(
[1− F (ri + λε)]
[1− F (ri + ε)]
)`−1
, (4.26)
which is a decreasing function in ε, and has the limit
lim
ε→0
Ψ(ε) = 1. (4.27)
Thus, there always exists a positive value δ. When ε < δ, Ψ(ε) < 1/α∗i,j. Further,
by putting (4.25) into (4.24), we have
Ui,j(v̂i,j)− Ui,j(vi,j) = ε · [1− F (ri + ε)]`−1[1− α∗i,j ·Ψ(ε)]. (4.28)
Therefore, ∃δ, for ε < δ, Ui,j(v̂i,j)−Ui,j(vi,j) > 0, which contradicts the assumption
that α∗i,j is a dominant truth-telling strategy. Considering such contradiction holds
for any α∗i,j, we finally prove that there does not exist a cheat-proof strategy for
the profit-sharing game.
Since there is no dominant truth-telling strategy in static profit-sharing games
as Theorem 4.3.4 shows, it is necessary to design certain mechanisms to enforce
the cooperation among the forwarding nodes on the same forwarding route. There
are many ways to design such mechanisms. For instance, an intuitive idea is to
provide over-payment to the nodes on the winning route as the compensation for
their cooperative behaviors. The over-payment should be more than the cheating
gain the nodes can obtain. But who is responsible for the over-payment? It
is not reasonable to ask the sender for the payment-compensation. Because, in
this way, the sender may have incentives to switch his/her transmission to the
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route with higher true cost, which asks for less over-payment. It is also a rational
behavior for such route to require a less over-payment, which may make them have
a positive payoff instead of losing the auction with zero payoffs. Therefore, a more
practical way is to let the central-bank periodically compensate the forwarding
nodes with some payments. The over-payment amount can be decided based on
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [15, 71], which pays each node the
difference between the routing cost without this node and the other nodes’ routing
cost with the presence of this node. It is important to note that the application of
the VCG mechanism here does not conflict with our dynamic pricing mechanism.
They are carried out separately by the central bank and the sender for ensuring
the cooperation of forwarding nodes on one route and maximizing the total profits
of the sender, respectively.
However, the over-payment method still requires some information of the overall
topology and forward costs, which may not be available in dynamic scenarios.
In order to have enforceable truth-telling mechanisms, it is reasonable to model
the profit-sharing interactions as a repeated game for each route. Generally
speaking, repeated games belong to the dynamic game family, which play a similar
static game many times. The overall payoff in a repeated game is represented as a
normalized discounted summation of the payoff at each stage game. A strategy in
the repeated game is a complete plan of action, that defines the players’ actions in
every stage game. At the end of each stage, all the players can observe the outcome
of the stage game and decide the future actions using the history of plays. The
repeated profit-sharing game (RPSG) can be defined as follows.
Definition 4.3.5 Let Γ be a static profit-sharing game and β be a discount factor.
The T -period profit-sharing repeated game, denoted as Γ(T, β), consists of game Γ
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where P ti,j denotes the payoff of the jth node on the i the route in period t. If T
goes infinity, then Γ(∞, β) is referred to as the infinite repeated game.
Note that Nash Equilibrium [8] is an important concept to measure the out-
come of the SPSG, which is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no
selfish player has incentive to unilaterally change his/her action. However, the
selfishness of players will result in inefficient non-cooperative Nash Equilibriums
in static games. As for dynamic games, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)
can be used to study the game outcomes, which is an equilibrium such that users’
strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame [8] of the original game.
In the RPSG, since the game is not played only once, the players is able to make
decisions conditioning on past moves for better outcomes, thus allowing for repu-
tation effects and retribution. Therefore, in order to measure the outcome of the
RPSG, we apply the Folk Theorems [8,64] of the infinite repeated games to have
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.6 In RPSG, there exists a discount factor β̂ < 1 such that any
feasible and individually rational payoff can be enforced by an equilibrium for any
discount factor β ∈ (β̂, 1).
The above theorem illustrates that feasible profit-sharing outcomes can be en-
forced in the RPSG when no dominant strategy is available. However, it didn’t
answer the question that how the feasible profit-sharing outcomes can be enforced,
that is, how to design the enforcing mechanisms in the RPSG. First, we define two
strategies: the cooperative strategy and non-cooperative strategy. In cooperative
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strategy, the node will report the true forwarding cost; in non-cooperative strategy,
the node will report a very high forwarding cost so that the route with this node
will not be selected for packet forwarding. Similar to [64, 79, 80], we propose the
following mechanism to enforce truth-telling strategies for the RPSG.
CArtel Maintenance Profit-sharing (CAMP) mechanism:
(1) Each node on the selected route plays the cooperative strategy at the first
stage;
(2) If the cooperation strategy is played in stage t and Ui =
∑hi
j=1 Pi,j ≥ Ũ ,
each node plays the cooperative strategy in stage t + 1;
(3) If the cooperation strategy is played in stage t and Ui < Ũ , each node
switches to a punishment phase for T − 1 stages, in which the non-cooperative
strategy is played regardless of the realized outcomes. At the T th period, each
node switches back to the cooperative strategy.
Note that Ũ is the cartel maintenance threshold. Similar to [64, 79, 80], the
optimal Ũ and T can be obtained using the routing statistics. The proposed
CAMP mechanism uses the non-cooperative punishment launched by all nodes
to prevent any deviating strategies from the cooperative strategy. Specifically,
although the deviating behaviors may benefit a node at current stage, its payoff
will be decreased more in future stages. By using the CAMP mechanism, the
truth-telling profit sharing is enforceable among the nodes on the selected route.
Based on Theorem 4.3.4, we can enforce any feasible profit sharing strategy such
as equal sharing or proportional sharing according to the effort of each node.
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4.4 Simulation Studies
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed dynamic pricing ap-
proach in multi-hop ad hoc networks. Note that the simulation setup is similarly to
that in Chapter 3. We consider an ad hoc network whereN nodes are randomly de-
ployed inside a rectangular region of 10γ m × 10γ m according to the 2-dimension
uniform distribution with the maximal transmission range γ = 100m for each node.
Let λ = Nπ/100 denote the normalized node density, that is, the average number
of neighbors for each node in the network. Each node moves according to the ran-
dom waypoint model [70]: a node starts at a random position, waits for a duration
called the pause time, then randomly chooses a new location and moves toward
the new location with a velocity uniformly chosen between vmin and vmax. When it
arrives at the new location, it waits for another random pause time and repeats the
process. The physical layer assumes that two nodes can directly communicate with
each other successfully only if they are in each other’s transmission range. The
MAC layer protocol simulates the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF) with a four-way handshaking mechanism [81]. Table 4.1 shows all simu-
lation parameters. Note that each source-destination pair is formed by randomly
picking two nodes in the network. And, multiple routes with different hop number
may exist for each source-destination pair. Since the routes with the minimum
number of hops have much higher probabilities to achieve lower costs, without loss
of generality, we only consider the minimum-hop routes as the bidding routes for
simplicity in the proposed optimal dynamic auction framework. Considering the
mobility of each node, its forwarding cost is no longer a fixed value and we assume
that its PDF f̂(v) follows the uniform distribution U [ū, u], which has the mean µ
and the variance σ2. Thus, using the Central Limit Theorem [78], the cost of a
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Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters
Node Density 10, 20, 30
Minimum Velocity (vmin) 10 m/s
Maximum Velocity (vmax) 30 m/s
Average Pause time 100 seconds
Dimensions of Space 1000m × 1000m
Maximum Transmission Range 100 m
Average Packet Inter-Arrival Time 1 seconds
Data Packet Size 1024 bytes
Link Bandwidth 8 Mbps
h-hop route can be approximated by the normal distribution with the mean h · µ
and variance h ·σ2. In our simulation, we first study the dynamics of MANET and
then illustrate the performance of our proposed framework for different network
settings.
In order to study the dynamics of MANET, we first conduct simulations to
study the number of hops on the minimum-hop route for source-destination pairs,
which can be found in Chapter 3 and shown in Figure 3.6. Secondly, we study the
time and path diversity of MANET by finding the maximum number of minimum-
hop routes for the source-destination pair. Note that there may exist the scenar-
ios where the node may be on multiple minimum-hop forwarding routes for the
same source-destination pair. For simplicity, we assume during the route discovery
phase, the destination randomly picks one of such routes as the routing candidates
and feedbacks the routing information of node-disjoint minimum-hop routes to the
source. Figure 4.3 shows the CMF of the number of the minimum-hop routes for
different hop number when the node density is 10. The results for the node den-
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Figure 4.3: The cumulative probability mass function of the number of the
minimum-hop route when the node density is 10.
sity 20 and 30 are shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 3.7, respectively. It can be seen
from the above figures that when the node density is increasing, the probability of
having more routes between each source-destination pair is becoming much higher.
Such facts also indicate a higher order of path diversity can be exploited when each
node has more neighbors. Moreover, the possibility of getting more routes for the
route with more hops is much lower since the path diversity for multi-hop routing
is limited by the forwarding node with the worst neighboring situation. Therefore,
the number of routing candidates and their types can be approximated using the
above results.
In the following parts, we consider the performance for three different schemes:
our scheme with finite time horizon, our scheme with infinite time horizon and the
fixed allocation scheme. Note that the infinite time horizon can not be achieved in
real application. But it can serve as a upper bound for measuring the performance
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Figure 4.4: The cumulative probability mass function of the number of the
minimum-hop route when the node density is 20.
of our scheme. The fixed scheme allocates a fixed number of packets into each stage
while also using the optimal auction at each stage. Assume the cheat-proof profit
sharing mechanisms are in place to ensure the cooperation of the forwarding nodes
on the same route. Let the benefit function be G(K) = g ·k, where g is the benefit
of successfully transmitting one packet. Note that the simulation parameters are
set as T = 20, M = 100 and B = 10. Let g = 60, ū = 10, and u = 15. In
Figure 4.5, we compare the overall profits of the three schemes for different node
densities. The concavity of the simulated value functions of our scheme matches
the theoretical statement in Lemma 4.3.2. It can be seen from the figure that our
scheme achieves significant performance gains over the fixed scheme, which mainly
comes from the time diversity exploited by the dynamic approach. We observe
that the performance gap of the two schemes becomes larger when the node density
decreases. Thus, in order to increase the profits under the situations of low node
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Finite time horizon, λ=10
Infinite time horizon, λ=10
Fixed scheme, λ=10
Finite time horizon, λ=20
Infinite time horizon, λ=20
Fixed scheme, λ=20
Finite time horizon, λ=30
Infinite time horizon, λ=30
Fixed scheme, λ=30
Figure 4.5: The overall profits of our scheme with finite time horizon, our scheme
with infinite time horizon and the fixed scheme.
densities, it becomes much more important to exploit the time diversity. Also, the
total profits of our scheme increases with the increment of the node density due to
the higher order of path diversity. Besides, since the performance gap between the
schemes with finite and infinite time horizon is small, only a few routing stages are
required to exploit the time diversity.
In Figure 4.6, the average profits of the three schemes are shown for different
node densities. This figure shows that the average profit of transmitting one packet
decreases as there are more packets to be transmitted. It is because the packets
need to share the limited routing resources from both the time diversity and path
diversity. When the node density is 30, the average profit degrades much slower
than other cases since the potential of utilizing both the time diversity and path
diversity is high. The overall profits of our scheme with finite time horizon are
compared for different total packets in Figure 4.7 for node density being 10. This
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Finite time horizon, λ=10
Infinite time horizon, λ=10
Finite time horizon, λ=20
Infinite time horizon, λ=20
Finite time horizon, λ=30
Infinite time horizon, λ=30
Figure 4.6: The average profits of our scheme with finite time horizon, our scheme
with infinite time horizon and the fixed scheme.
figure shows that the overall profits increases with more routing stages due to the
time diversity. Also, the saturation behavior can be observed when using more
stages. In Figure 4.8, the overall profits are compared for different time stages.
Considering the limited routing resource, the overall profits saturate when the
packet number is high.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we study how to conduct efficient pricing-based routing in au-
tonomous MANETs by assuming that the packet-forwarding will incur a cost to the
relay node and the successful transmission brings benefits to the source-destination
pairs. Considering the dynamic nature of MANET, we model the routing procedure
in autonomous MANETs as a multi-stage pricing game and propose an optimal
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Figure 4.7: The overall profits of our scheme with different packets to be trans-
mitted when the node density is 10.


















Figure 4.8: The overall profits of our scheme with different time stages when the
node density is 10.
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dynamic pricing-based routing approach to maximize the payoffs of the source-
destination pair while keeping the forwarding incentives of the relay nodes on the
selected routes by optimally pricing their packet-forwarding services through the
auction protocol. It is important to notice that not only the path diversity but
also the time diversity in MANETs can be exploited by our dynamic pricing-based
approach. Also, the optimal dynamic auction algorithm is developed to achieve
the optimal allocation of packets to be transmitted, which provides the corre-
sponding pricing rules while taking into consideration of the node’s mobility and
the routing dynamics. Extensive simulations have been conducted to study the
performances of the proposed approach. The results illustrate that the proposed
approach achieves significant performance gains over the existing static routing
approaches.
4.6 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 4.3.2
Proof First, we prove that 4Vt(x) is decreasing in x at any fixed time period
t. Note that the induction method is used to prove this part of Lemma 4.3.2. For
t = 0, the lemma obviously holds since V0(x) = 0 for all x. Assume the inductive
hypothesis for period t− 1 as 4Vt−1(x) ≥ 4Vt−1(x + 1). Then, we will show that
if the inductive hypothesis holds, 4Vt(x) also decreases.
Consider a realization of `t routes and their cost vector r = (r1, r2, ..., r`t).
Define the inner maximized term in (4.10) as follows
Ut(x, `t, r) = max
0≤k≤min{B,x}
{Rt(k) + β · Vt−1(x− k)}, (4.30)
and define the difference function as
4Ut(x, `t, r) = Ut(x, `t, r)− Ut(x− 1, `t, r). (4.31)
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Thus 4Vt(x) can be obtained as
4Vt(x) = E`t,r[4Ut(x, `t, r)]. (4.32)
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we omit the arguments `t, r in4Ut(x, `t, r)
and simply use 4Ut(x). Moreover, it can be seen from (4.32) that it is sufficient
to prove that 4Ut(x) is decreasing in x for the proof that 4Vt(x) is decreasing in
x.
Using the inductive hypothesis and Lemma 4.3.2, we have the constraint on
k∗t (x + 1) as
k∗t (x) ≤ k∗t (x + 1) ≤ k∗t (x) + 1. (4.33)
Based on the constraint, we then study the value of 4Ut(x+1) for the two possible
outcomes, k∗t (x + 1) = k
∗
t (x) and k
∗
t (x + 1) = k
∗
t (x) + 1:
1). If k∗t (x+1) = k
∗
t (x), then 4Ut(x+1) = β ·4Vt−1(x−k∗t (x)+1) from (4.30)
and (4.31). Also, from the optimal condition of k in (4.12), we know
4Rt(k∗t (x + 1) + 1) ≤ β · 4Vt−1(x + 1− (k∗t (x + 1) + 1) + 1). (4.34)
Considering k∗t (x + 1) = k
∗
t (x), (4.34) can be rewritten as
4Rt(k∗t (x) + 1) ≤ β · 4Vt−1(x− k∗t (x) + 1). (4.35)
2). Similarly, If k∗t (x+1) = k
∗
t (x)+ 1, then 4Ut(x+1) = 4Rt(k∗t (x)+ 1) from
(4.30) and (4.31), and
4Rt(k∗t (x) + 1) > β · 4Vt−1(x− k∗t (x) + 1). (4.36)
Thus, it can be concluded from the above two cases that 4Ut(x + 1) satisfies
4Ut(x + 1) = max{4Rt(k∗t (x) + 1), β · 4Vt−1(x− k∗t (x) + 1)}. (4.37)
91
Consider now4Ut(x+1) and4Ut(x) and compare their values. Given the con-
straint on k∗t (x) by Lemma 4.3.2, the value of 4Ut(x+1) in (4.37), and considering
that 4Rt(m) and 4Vt−1(m) decrease in their arguments, we have the following
expressions.
4Ut(x)
= max{4Rt(k∗t (x− 1) + 1), β · 4Vt−1(x− 1− k∗t (x− 1) + 1)}
≥ max{4Rt(k∗t (x) + 1), β · 4Vt−1(x− (k∗t (x)− 1))}
= 4Ut(x + 1). (4.38)
Therefore, the first part of Lemma 4.3.2 is proved by the above discussion.
Next, we show that 4Vt(x) is increasing in t for any fixed x. Similarly, it
suffices to prove the statement for a particular realization `t, r.
Following the results in (4.37), we get that
4Ut(x) ≥ β · 4Vt−1(x− k∗t (x)), (4.39)
and from the fact that 4Vt−1(·) is decreasing, we have
4Ut(x) ≥ β · 4Vt−1(x). (4.40)
As taking the expectation with respect to `t, r on both sides of (4.40) does affect
the inequality, we prove






Recently, regulatory bodies like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in the United States are recognizing that current static spectrum allocation can be
very inefficient considering the bandwidth demands may vary highly along the time
dimension or the space dimension. In order to fully utilize the scarce spectrum
resources, with the development of cognitive radio technologies, dynamic spectrum
access becomes a promising approach to increase the efficiency of spectrum usage,
which allows unlicensed wireless users to dynamically access the licensed bands
from legacy spectrum holders based on leasing agreements.
Cognitive radio technologies have the potential to provide the wireless devices
with various capabilities, such as frequency agility, adaptive modulation, transmit
power control and localization. The advances of cognitive radio technologies make
more efficient and intensive spectrum access possible on a negotiated or an oppor-
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tunistic basis. Although the existing dynamic spectrum access schemes described
in Chapter 2 have achieved some success on enhancing the spectrum efficiency
and distributive design for autonomous DSANs, most of them focus on efficient
spectrum allocation given fixed topologies and cannot quickly adapt to the dy-
namics of wireless networks due to node mobility, channel variations or varying
wireless traffic. Furthermore, existing cognitive spectrum sharing approaches gen-
erally assume that the network users will act cooperatively to maximize the overall
system performance, which is a reasonable assumption for traditional emergency
or military situations. However, with the emerging applications of mobile ad hoc
networks envisioned in civilian usage, the users may not serve a common goal or
belong to a single authority, which requires that the network functions can be
carried out in a self-organized way to combat the selfish behaviors. In dynamic
spectrum allocation scenarios, the users’ selfishness causes more challenges for effi-
cient mechanism design, such as incentive-stimulation and price of anarchy [8,58].
Therefore, novel spectrum allocation approaches need to be developed considering
the dynamic nature of wireless networks and users’ selfish behaviors.
Considering a general network scenario in which multiple primary users (legacy
spectrum holders) and secondary users (unlicensed users) coexist, primary users
attempt to sell unused spectrum resources to secondary users for monetary gains
while secondary users try to acquire spectrum usage permissions from primary
users to achieve certain communication goals, which generally introduces reward
payoffs for them. In order to solve the above issues, we consider the spectrum shar-
ing in autonomous DSANs as multistage dynamic games and propose a dynamic
pricing approach to optimize the overall spectrum efficiency, meanwhile, keeping
the participating incentives of the users based on double-auction rules and coping
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with the budget constraints by dynamic programming. The main contributions of
this chapter are multi-fold. First, by modeling the spectrum sharing as a dynamic
pricing game, we are able to quickly and accurately coordinate the spectrum allo-
cation among primary and secondary users through a trading process to maximize
the payoffs of both primary and secondary users. Further, we develop a belief
system to assist greedy users update their strategies adaptive to the spectrum
demand and supply changes, which not only approaches the theoretical optimal
outcomes of the spectrum allocation problem but also substantially decreases the
pricing overhead due to frequent bid/ask updates and message exchange. Third,
by considering the budget constraints of the secondary users, the proposed dy-
namic pricing approach is able to further exploit the time diversity of spectrum
resources.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The system model of
dynamic spectrum allocation is described in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we for-
mulate the spectrum allocation as pricing games based on the system model. In
Section 5.4, the belief-based dynamic pricing approach is proposed for the optimal
spectrum allocation. The simulation studies are provided in Section 5.5. Finally,
Section 5.6 summarizes this chapter.
5.2 System Description
We consider the wireless networks where multiple primary users and secondary
users operate simultaneously in a wireless network, which may represent various
network scenarios. For instance, the primary users can be the spectrum broker con-
nected to the core network and the secondary users are the base stations equipped
with cognitive radio technologies; or the primary users are the access points of
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a mesh network and the secondary users are the mobile devices. On one hand,
every primary user has the license of using a certain spectrum range, which can
be divided into non-overlapping orthogonal channels. Considering that the autho-
rized spectrum of primary users may not be fully utilized over time, they prefer
to lease the unused channels to the secondary users for monetary gains. On the
other hand, since the unlicensed spectrums become more and more crowded, the
secondary users may try to lease some unused channels from primary users for
more communication gains by providing leasing payments.
In our system model, we assume all users are selfish and rational, that is, their
objectives are to maximize their own payoffs, not to cause damage to other users.
However, users are allowed to cheat whenever they believe cheating behaviors can
help them to increase their payoffs. Generally speaking, in order to acquire the
spectrum licenses from regulatory bodies such as FCC, the primary users have
certain operating costs. With regard to secondary users, in order to have the
rewards of achieving certain communication goals, they want to utilize more spec-
trum resources. The selfishness of both primary and secondary users will prevent
them from revealing their private information such as acquisition costs or reward
payoffs, which makes traditional spectrum allocation approaches not applicable
under this scenario. Therefore, novel spectrum allocation approaches need to be
developed which not only optimize the spectrum efficiency but also extract the
private information from the selfish parties through certain mechanisms to assist
the optimization of spectrum allocation.
Specifically, we consider the collection of the available spectrums from all pri-
mary users as a spectrum pool, which totally consists of N non-overlapping chan-
nels. Assume there are J primary users and K secondary users, indicated by the
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set P = {p1, p2, ..., pJ} and S = {s1, s2, ..., sK}, respectively. We represent the
channels authorized to primary user pi using a vector Ai = {aji}j∈{1,2,...,ni}, where
aji represents the channel index in the spectrum pool and ni is the total number
of channels which belong to user pi. Define A as the set of all the channels in the
spectrum pool. Moreover, denote the acquisition costs of user pi’s channels as the
vector Ci = {ca
j
i
i }j∈{1,2,...,ni}, where the jth element represents the acquisition cost




i . As for secondary user
si, we define her/his payoff vector as Vi = {vji }j∈{1,2,...,N}, where the jth element
is the reward payoff if this user successfully leases the jth channel in the spectrum
pool.
5.3 Pricing Game Model
In this chapter, we model the dynamic spectrum allocation problem as a pricing
game to study the interactions among the players, i.e., the primary and secondary
users. Based on the discussion in the previous section, we are able to have the
payoff functions of the players in our dynamic game. Specifically, if primary user
pi reaches agreements of leasing all or part of her/his channels to secondary users,











where φAi = {φaji}j∈{1,2,...,ni} and φaji is the payment that user pi obtains from
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i ∈ {0, 1} which indicates if the jth channel of user










(vji − φj)βji , (5.2)
where φA = {φj}j∈{1,2,...,N}, βAi = {βji }j∈{1,2,...,N}. Note that βji ∈ {0, 1} illustrates
if secondary user si successfully leases the jth channel in the spectrum pool or not.
Hence, the strategies of the primary users and secondary users are actually defined
by αAii and β
A
i , respectively.
Since the players may have conflict interests with each other, our dynamic spec-
trum sharing game can be modeled as a multi-stage non-cooperation game. To be
specific, from the primary users’ point of view, they want to earn the payments by
leasing the unused channels which not only cover their spectrum acquisition costs
but also gain as much extra payments as possible; from the secondary users’ point
of view, they aim to accomplish their communication goals by providing the least
possible payments to lease the channels; while from the network designers’ point
of view, they attempt to maximize the network performance, which in our case is
the spectrum efficiency. Therefore, the spectrum users involved in the spectrum
sharing process construct a non-cooperative pricing game [8, 10]. Since the self-
ish users are their own authorities, they will not reveal their private information
to others unless some mechanisms have been applied to guarantee that it is not
harmful to disclose the private information. Generally, such non-cooperative game
with incomplete information is complex and difficult to study as the players do
not know the perfect strategy profile of others. But based on our game setting,
the well-developed auction theory [63] can be applied to formulate and analyze the
pricing game.
In auction games [63], according to an explicit set of rules, the principles (auc-
tioneers) determine resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the
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agents (bidders). In our spectrum allocation pricing game, the primary users can
be viewed as the principles, who attempts to sell the unused channels to the sec-
ondary users. The secondary users are the bidders who compete with each other to
buy the permission of using primary users’ channels, by which they may gain ex-
tra payoffs for future use. In our pricing game, multiple sellers and buyers coexist,
which indicates the double auction scenario. It means that not only the secondary
users but also the primary users need to compete with each other to make the
beneficial transactions possible by eliciting their willingness of the payments in the
forms of bids or asks. Specifically, the double auction is one of the most common
exchange mechanisms, used extensively in stock markets such as the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or commodity markets such as Chicago Merchandize Ex-
change (CME). The most important property of double auction mechanism is its
high efficiency, which is still not fully understood in economic theory. Moreover,
it can respond quickly to changing conditions of auction participants. However, in
order to achieve the full efficiency of the double auction mechanism, a lot of mes-
sages need to be exchanged among the auction participants, which can be easily
implemented by powerful central authorities in stock or commodity markets. It is
worth noticing that in autonomous wireless networks either central authorities can
be pre-assumed or the bandwidth of control channels is very limited. Therefore,
we aims to develop an efficient pricing approach for spectrum allocation, which
not only has the prevalence of the double auction mechanism but also uses simple
message exchanges to quickly and accurately coordinate the spectrum sharing.
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5.4 Belief-Assisted Dynamic Pricing
5.4.1 Static Pricing Game and Competitive Equilibrium
Assume that the available channels from the primary users are leased for usage of
certain time period T . Also, we assume that the cost of the primary users and
reward payoffs of the secondary users remain unchanged over this period. Before
this spectrum sharing period, we define a trading period τ , within which the users
exchange their information of bids and asks to achieve agreements of spectrum
usage. The time period T + τ is considered as one stage in our pricing game. We
first study the interactions of the players in static pricing games. Note that the
users’ goals are to maximize their own payoff functions. As for the primary users,












({φ−aji , φaji}, β
A








6= 0, aji ∈ Ai. (5.4)
where φ̃aji
is any feasible payment and φ−aji is the payment vector excluding the
element of the payment for the channel aji . Note that ŝaji











k = 0,∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}.
(5.5)
Thus, (5.4) is the incentive compatible constraint [63]. It means that the secondary
users have incentives to provide the optimal payment because they cannot have
extra gains by cheating on the primary users. Similarly, the optimization problem







i ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} (5.6)
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s.t. Ubpj({φ−j, φj}, βAi ) ≥ Ubpj({φ−j, φ̃j}, βAi ),
p̂j 6= 0, βji = 1. (5.7)







i = 1, j ∈ Ak, αjk = 1
0 otherwise,∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}.
(5.8)
Similarly, (5.7) is the incentive compatible constraint for the primary users, which
guarantees that the primary user will give the usage permission of their channels
to the secondary users so that they can receive the optimal payments.
Figure 5.1: Illustration of supply and demand functions.
From (5.3) and (5.6), we can see that in order to obtain the optimal allocation
and payments, a multi-objective optimization problem needs to be solved, which
becomes extremely complicated due to our game setting that only involves incom-
plete information. Thus, in order to make this problem tangible, we analyze it
from the game theory point of view. Generally speaking, game theory provides
well-developed equilibrium concepts or optimality criteria to study the outcomes
101
of games. For instance, Nash Equilibrium [10] is an important concept to mea-
sure the outcome of a non-cooperation game, which is a set of strategies, one for
each player, such that no selfish player has incentive to unilaterally change his/her
action. In order to further measure the efficiency of game outcomes, Pareto Op-
timality [8] is defined such that a Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved
upon without hurting at least one player. Often, a Nash equilibrium is not Pareto
optimal while Pareto optimal outcomes may not be sustained considering the self-
ishness of the players. Further, considering the double auction scenarios of our
pricing game, Competitive Equilibrium (CE) [82] is a well-known theoretical
prediction of the outcomes. It is the price at which the number of buyers willing
to buy is equal to the number of sellers willing to sell. Alternatively, CE can also
be interpreted as where the supply and demand match [63]. The supply function
can be defined as the relationship between the acquisition costs of primary users
and the number of corresponding channels; the demand function can be defined
as the relationship between the reward payoffs of secondary users and the number
of corresponding channels. We describe the supply and demand functions in Fig-
ure 5.1. Note that CE is also proved to be Pareto optimal in stationary double
auction scenarios [83]. It is worth noting that in order to achieve the CE the tradi-
tional continuous bid/ask interactions among players will involve a great amount
of message exchanges and require powerful centralized control, which may not be
applicable to wireless networking scenarios due to the limited bandwidth of control
channels.
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5.4.2 Belief-Assisted Dynamic Pricing Scheme
Considering network dynamics due to mobility, channel variations or wireless traf-
fic variations, the secondary users may have different reward payoffs of acquiring
certain channels from primary users at different time stages. Specifically, since
the secondary users can be mobile devices, they may move out the access range of
certain channels and hence the corresponding reward payoffs vji are regarded as 0.
Or, the secondary users may face various channel fading conditions within different
spectrum ranges or during different time periods, which changes their payoff values
vji at different time stages. Moreover, the costs of primary users will also change
over time due to network dynamics. For instance, if the legacy users themselves
have larger spectrum demands, some legacy channels may not be available for leas-
ing anymore, which actually indicates an infinite leasing cost of those channels in
our pricing model. In brief, cji and v
j
i need to be considered as random variables
in dynamic scenarios, which we assume to satisfy the probability density functions
(PDF) fc(c) and fv(v), respectively. Therefore, considering dynamic network con-
ditions, we further model the spectrum sharing as a multi-stage dynamic pricing
game. Let γ be the discount factor of the multi-stage game. Based on (5.3) and























γt · Usi,t(φA,t, βAi,t)], (5.10)
where the subscript t indicates the tth stage of the multi-stage game. Generally
speaking, there may exist some overall constraints of spectrum sharing such as each
secondary user’s total budget for leasing spectrum resources or each primary user’s
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total available spectrum supply. Under these constraints, the above problem need
to be further modeled as a dynamic programming process [45,68] to obtain optimal
sequential strategies by considering some state parameters such as the number of
channels to be allocated at every stage or the residual monetary budget. However,
the major difficulty of dynamic spectrum sharing lies in that how to efficiently
and quickly update the spectrum sharing strategies adapt to the changing network
conditions only based on local information. Therefore, in the following parts,
we first focus on developing a belief-assisted dynamic pricing approach, which can
not only approach CE outcomes but also responds quickly to networking dynamics
while only introducing limited overhead. Then, the total budget constraint is taken
into consideration and a dynamic programming approach is further proposed to
obtain the optimal sequential strategies.
Belief-Assisted Dynamic Pricing for Efficient Spectrum Allocation
Since our pricing game belongs to the non-cooperation games with incomplete in-
formation [10], the players need to build up certain beliefs of other players’ future
possible strategies to assist their decision making. Considering that there are mul-
tiple players with private information in the pricing game and what directly affect
the outcome of the game are the bid/ask prices, it is more efficient to define one
common belief function based on the publicly observed bid/ask prices than gener-
ating specific belief of every other player’s private information. Hence, enlightened
by [82], we consider the primary/secondary users’ beliefs as the ratio their bid/ask
being accepted at different price levels. At each time during the dynamic spectrum







where µ(x) and µA(x) are the number of asks at x and the number of accepted asks
at x, respectively. Similarly, at each time during the dynamic spectrum sharing,





where η(y) and ηA(y) are the number of bids at y and the number of accepted
bids at y, respectively. Usually, r̃p(x) and r̃s(y) can be accurately estimated if a
great number of buyers and sellers are participating in the pricing at the same
time. However, in our pricing game, only a relatively small number of players are
involved in the spectrum sharing at the specific time. The beliefs, namely, r̃p(x)
and r̃s(y) cannot be practically obtained so that we need to further consider using
the historical bid/ask information to build up empirical belief values. Considering
the characteristics of double auction, we have the following observations:
• If an ask x̃ < x is rejected, the ask at x will also be rejected;
• If an ask x̃ > x is accepted, the ask at x will also be accepted;
• If a bid ỹ > x is made, the ask at x will also be accepted.
Based on the above observations, the players’ beliefs can be further defined as
follows using the past bid/ask information.
















0 x ≥ M
(5.13)
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where µR(w) is the number of asks at w that has been rejected, M is a large enough
value so that the asks greater than M won’t be accepted. Also, it is intuitive that
the ask at 0 will be definitely accepted as no cost is introduced.















y ∈ (0, M)
1 y ≥ M
(5.14)
where ηR(w) is the number of bids at w that has been rejected. And, it is intuitive
that the bid at 0 will not be accepted by any primary users.
Noting that it is too costly to build up beliefs on every possible bid or ask price,
we can update the beliefs only at some fixed prices and use interpolation to obtain
the belief function over the price space. Then, it is worth discussing the effect of the
available public information on the efficiency of the above belief system. First, in
the scenario that only local information is available to each user, the user updates
the belief based on her/his own observed past bid/ask information, which results
in more message exchanges to achieve the equilibrium price. Second, considering
the broadcast nature of wireless channels, the neighbors’ bid/ask information may
be observed by the users, which can also be utilized to update the beliefs. In this
scenario, the users may have part of the public information besides of their private
information, which may accelerate their belief-updating pace and result in more
efficient pricing process. Moreover, if the users have the access to all the public
information such as ask/bid interactions through some centralized point, the above
belief function is able to quickly reflect current supply and demand relationships.
Before using our defined belief functions to assist the strategy decisions, we
first look at the Spread Reduction Rule (SRR) of double auction mechanisms.
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Generally, before the double auction pricing game converges to CE, there may
exist a gap between the highest bid and lowest ask, which is called the spread
of double auction. The SRR states that any ask that is permissible must be
lower than current lowest ask, i.e., outstanding ask [82], and then either each new
ask results in an agreed transaction or it becomes the new outstanding ask. A
similar argument can be applied to bids. By defining current outstanding ask
and bid as ox and oy, respectively, we let r̄p(x) = r̂p(x) · I[0,ox)(x) for each x and
r̄s(y) = r̂s(x) · I(oy,M ](y) for each y, which are modified belief function considering





1 if x ∈ (a, b);
0 otherwise.
(5.15)
By using the belief function r̄p(x), the payoff maximization of selling the ith pri-




where Upi(x, j) represents the payoff introduced by allocating the jth channel when
the ask is x, and then E[Upi(x, j)] = (x− cji ) · r̄p(x). Similarly, as for the secondary
user si, the payoff maximization of leasing the jth channel in the spectrum pool




where Usi(y, j) represents the payoff introduced by leasing the jth channel in the
spectrum pool when the bid is y, and then E[Usi(y, j)] = (v
j
i −y) · r̄s(y). Therefore,
by solving the optimization problem for each primary and secondary user using
(5.16) and (5.17), respectively, primary and secondary users can make the optimal
decision of spectrum allocation at every stage conditional on dynamic spectrum
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Table 5.1: Belief-assisted dynamic spectrum allocation
1. Initialize the users’ beliefs and bids/asks
¦ The primary users initialize their asks as large values close to M
and their beliefs as small positive values less than 1;
¦ The secondary users initialize their bids as small values close to 0
and their beliefs as small positive values less than 1.
2. Belief update based on local information:
Update primary and secondary users’ beliefs
using (5.13) and (5.14), respectively
3. Optimal bid/ask update:
¦ Obtain the optimal ask for each primary user by solving (5.16);
¦ Obtain the optimal bid for each secondary user by solving (5.17).
4. Update leasing agreement and spectrum pool:
¦ If the outstanding bid is greater than or equal to the outstanding ask,
the leasing agreement will be signed between the corresponding users;
¦ Update the spectrum pool by removing the assigned channel.
5. Iteration:
If the spectrum pool is not empty, go back to Step 2.
demand and supply. Based on the above discussions, we illustrate our belief-
assisted dynamic pricing algorithm for spectrum allocation in Table 5.1.
Dynamic Pricing with Budget Constraints
Based on the belief-assisted dynamic pricing algorithm developed above, in this
part we further consider the optimal spectrum allocation when each secondary
user is constrained by a total monetary budget for leasing spectrum usage. Note
that the spectrum allocation problem can be similarly solved when the overall
constraints exist for primary users.
Considering the budget constraints of secondary users, we rewrite their opti-
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γt · Usi,t(φA,t, βAi,t, ψ̃i,t)], (5.18)
s.t. Ubpj ,t({φ−j,t, φj,t}) ≥ Ubpj ,t({φ−j,t, φ̃j,t}), (5.19)
∞∑
t=1
ψt ≤ Bi. (5.20)
where ψi = {ψi,t}t∈{1,2,...,∞} and ψi,t is the total monetary payment used during
the tth stage for the ith secondary user leasing the channels. Moreover, Bi is
the ith secondary user’ total budget. Note that ψ̃i,t = Bi −
∑τ=t−1
τ=1 ψi,τ , which is
the residual budget at the tth stage and can be considered as a state parameter.
Hence, (5.19) and (5.20) are the incentive compatible constraint and total budget
constraint, respectively. As it is difficult to directly solve (5.18), we study the
dynamic programming approach to simplify the multistage optimization problem.
Define the value function Qsi,t(ψ̃i) as the ith secondary user’s maximum ex-
pected payoff obtainable from periods t, t+1, ...,∞ given that the monetary budget
left is ψ̃i. Simplifying (5.18) using the Bellman equation [68], we have the maximal





{Ecji ,vji [Usi,t(φA,t, β
A
i,t, ψ̃i) + γ ·Qsi,t+1(ψ̃i − ψi,t)]}, (5.21)
s.t. Ubpj ,t({φ−j,t, φj,t}) ≥ Ubpj ,t({φ−j,t, φ̃j,t}). (5.22)
The boundary conditions for the above dynamic programming problem are
Qsi,∞(ψ̃i) = 0, ψ̃i ∈ (0, Bi]. (5.23)
Note that the first term on the right hand side (RHS) of (5.21) represents the
payoff at current stage and the second term on the RHS of (5.21) represents the
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future payoff obtained after the tth stage give the budget state ψ̃i − ψi,t. Further,
applying the principle of optimality in [68], the spectrum sharing configuration
{φA,t, βAi,t, ψi} that achieves the maximum in (5.21) given ψ̃i, t and the statistics
of cji , v
j
i is also the optimal solution for the overall optimization problem (5.18).
In order to obtain Qsi,t(ψ̃i), the maximal payoff of one stage needs to be first
derived for different residual budget values ψ̃i. The difference of the current payoff
function in (5.18) and the one-stage payoff function in (5.6) lies in that the applied
budget constraint affects the outcomes of the pricing game. For instance, even
though both the primary users and secondary users can achieve higher payoffs
by assigning a channel to user si, the user si may not have enough budgets to
lease this channel. Thus, the algorithm in Table 5.1 cannot be directly applied
here for optimal spectrum sharing. We need to modify the bid update step as
follows: user si updates his/her bid by min{ψ̃i, y}, where y is obtained from (5.17).
Note that it is highly complicated to derive the close-form solution for the one-
stage payoff function in (5.18) [63, 83].Thus, we use simulation to approximate it
for different residual budget values, which proceeds as follows: Generate a large
number of samples of the secondary and primary users with reward payoffs and
costs satisfying fv(v) and fc(c), respectively. Using the above modified version of
the algorithm in Table 5.1, calculate the average one-stage payoffs given different
ψ̃ based on the outcomes of the spectrum allocation samples.
By using the numerical results of the one-stage payoff function, we then de-
rive Qsi,t(ψ̃i) using dynamic programming methods. Considering infinite spectrum





{Ecji ,vji [Usi,t(φA,t, β
A
i,t, ψ̃i) + γ ·Q∗si(ψ̃i − ψi,t)]}, (5.24)
or, equivalently, Q∗si = T Q∗si , where T is the operator updating Q∗si using (5.24).
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Let S be the feasible set of the state parameter. The convergence proposition
of the dynamic programming algorithm [68] can be applied here, which states
that: for any bounded function Q : S → R, the optimal payoff function satisfies
Q∗(x) = limp→∞(T pQ)(x),∀x ∈ S. As Qsi(ψ̃i) is bounded in our algorithm, we
are able to apply the value iteration method to approximate the optimal Qsi(ψ̃i),




g(x), where the superscript stands for the iteration number. Then, iteratively
update Qsi(ψ̃i) by letting Q
p+1
si
(ψ̃i) = (T Qpsi)(ψ̃i). The iteration process ends until
|Qp+1si (ψ̃i)−Qpsi(ψ̃i)| ≤ ε, for all ψ̃i ∈ S, where ε is the error bound for Q∗si(ψ̃i).
Intuitively, the basic idea behind our dynamic pricing approach for spectrum
allocation with budget constraints can be explained as follows: Considering the
overall budget constraints, the users make their spectrum sharing decisions not
only based on their current payoffs but also based on expected future payoffs.
Specifically, if the competition for spectrum resources is high at current stage,
the users prefer to save their monetary budgets for future usage, which will yield
higher overall payoffs for the users. Therefore, by using our proposed dynamic
pricing approach, the spectrum allocation can be optimized not only in the space
and frequency domains but also in the the time domain.
5.5 Simulation Studies
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed belief-assisted dynamic
spectrum sharing approach in wireless networks. Considering a wireless network
covering 100 × 100 area, we simulate J primary users by randomly placing them
in the network. These primary users can be the base stations serving for different
wireless network operators or different access points in a mesh network. Here
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the total payoff for the proposed scheme and theoretical
Competitive Equilibrium.
we assume the primary users’ locations are fixed and their unused channels are
available to the secondary users within the distance of 50. Then, we randomly
deploy K secondary users in the network, which are assumed to be mobile devices.
The mobility of the secondary users is modeled using a simplified random waypoint
model [70], where we assume the “thinking time” at each waypoint is close to the
effective duration of one channel-leasing agreement, the waypoints are uniformly
distributed within the distance of 10, and the traveling time is much smaller than
the “thinking time”. Let the cost of an available channel in the spectrum pool
be uniformly distributed in [10, 30], the reward payoff of leasing one channel be
uniformly distributed in [20, 40]. If a channel is not available to some secondary
users, let the corresponding reward payoffs of this channel be 0. Note that J = 5
and 103 pricing stages have been simulated. Let ni = 4, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} and
γ = 0.99.
We first focus our simulation studies on dynamic spectrum sharing without
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the overhead between the proposed scheme and contin-
uous double auction scheme.
budget constraints, which can be used to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed
belief-assisted pricing algorithm for spectrum allocation. In our simulation, the
local bid/ask information within the transmission range of each node is used for
belief construction and update. In Figure 5.2, we compare the total payoff of
all users of our proposed approach with that of the theoretical CE outcomes for
different number of secondary users. It can be seen from this figure that the
performance loss of our approach is very limited compared to that of the theoretical
optimal solutions. Moreover, when the number of secondary users increases, our
approach is able to approach the optimal CE. It is because that the belief function
reflects the spectrum demand and supply more accurately when more users are
involved in spectrum sharing.
Now we study the overhead of our pricing approach. Here we measure the
pricing overhead by showing the average number of bids and asks for each stage.
In Figure 5.3, the overhead of our pricing approach is compared to that of the
traditional continuous double auction when the same total payoff is achieved. As-
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of the total payoffs of the proposed scheme with those of
the static scheme.
sume the minimal bid/ask step δ of the continuous double auction to be 0.01. It
can be seen from the figure that our approach substantially decreases the pricing
communication overhead. Note that when decreasing the overhead, our proposed
approach may introduce extra complexity to update the beliefs.
Then, we study the dynamic spectrum allocation when each secondary user
is constrained by his/her monetary budget. For comparison, we define a static
scheme in which the secondary users make their spectrum-leasing decisions without
considering their budget limits. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
budget constraints for the secondary users are the same. In Figure 5.4, we compare
the total payoffs of our proposed dynamic programming scheme with those of the
static scheme for different budget constraints. It can be seen from the figure that
our proposed scheme achieves significant performance gains over the static scheme
when the budget constraints are taken into consideration. Also, when the budget




In this chapter, we have studied dynamic pricing for efficient spectrum allocation
in wireless networks with selfish users. We model the dynamic spectrum allocation
as a multi-stage game and propose a belief-assisted dynamic pricing approach to
maximize the users’ payoffs while providing them the participating incentives via
double auction rules. Further, the dynamic pricing under the budget constraints of
secondary users is analyzed using dynamic programming. Simulation results show
that the proposed scheme can approach the optimal performances by only using
limited overhead. Moreover, the time diversity of spectrum resources can be fully
exploited when budget constraints exist.
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Chapter 6
Multi-Stage Pricing Game for
Collusion-Resistant Dynamic
Spectrum Allocation
In this chapter, we focus on studying the collusive behavior of selfish users in
autonomous DSANs. We first discuss the impact of user collusion on auction-
based dynamic spectrum allocation approaches in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, we
study collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation for two simplified scenarios:
(1) multiple secondary users and one primary user (MSOP); (2) one secondary
user and multiple primary users (OSMP). Further, we extend our study to a more
generalized spectrum allocation scenario with multiple primary users and multiple
secondary users (MSMP) in Section 6.3. The simulation studies and summary are
provided in Section 6.4 and Section 6.5, respectively.
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6.1 User Collusion in Auction-Based Spectrum
Allocation
In order to have a robust dynamic spectrum allocation mechanism in wireless net-
works with selfish users, the cheating behaviors of selfish users need to be well
studied and counteracted. Otherwise, the spectrum allocation mechanism may be-
come unsustainable and leads to unpredictable outcomes. On one hand, spectrum
allocation can be generally regarded to be similar to generic medium access control
(MAC) problems in existing systems and studied from the perspective of wireless
resource allocation [19, 27, 57]. On the other hand, efficient spectrum allocation
can be achieved by studying it from the perspective of the driving economic force
and mechanisms [18, 42, 59]. Therefore, the unique property of dynamic spectrum
allocation imposes new challenges on its mechanism design against cheating be-
haviors. Basically, all the cheating behaviors related to MAC problems in wireless
system still threaten the functionalities of spectrum sharing mechanisms. More im-
portantly, wireless spectrum becomes a scarce resource and has huge economical
potential, which can only be exploited through efficient pricing-based market de-
signs. Thus, the cheating threats on these market designs make the robust dynamic
spectrum access a even more complicated problem. Since the cheating behaviors
on MAC protocols can still be solved using traditional countermeasures and the
auction mechanisms has the incentive-compatible property for each single user, we
will focus our study on efficient collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation
mechanism.
Although incentive-compatibility can be assured in most auction-based dy-
namic spectrum allocation approaches such as the optimal auction [45,63] or Vick-
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Figure 6.1: No collusion in pricing-based dynamic spectrum allocation.
rey auction [63], which indicates that no selfish user will cheat on the auction
mechanism unilaterally, one prevalent cheating behavior, the bidding collusion
among users, has been generally overlooked. To be specific, the bidders (or sellers)
act collusively and engage in bid rigging with a view to obtaining lower prices (or
higher prices). The resulting arrangement is called the bidding ring. In the sce-
narios of auction-based spectrum allocation, the bidding ring among the primary
users (or secondary users) will result in increasing their utilities by collusively leas-
ing the spectrum channels at a higher price (or at a lower price). Considering the
spectrum dynamics caused by wireless channel variations, user mobility or varying
wireless traffic, it becomes difficult to tell if the price variation comes from possible
bidding collusion or the varying demand and supply of spectrum resources. Hence,
traditional auction-based spectrum allocation mechanisms become vulnerable and
unstable with the presence of collusive behaviors.
In Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, we illustrate a snapshot of pricing-based dynamic
spectrum access networks where there is no user collusion and exists user collusion,
respectively. In the above figures, we consider the primary base station as the
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Figure 6.2: User collusion in pricing-based dynamic spectrum allocation.
primary user and the unlicensed mobile users as the secondary users. When there
is no user collusion as in Figure 6.1, the pricing interactions between the primary
user and secondary users leads to efficient spectrum allocation. When there exist
several bidding rings as in Figure 6.2, each bidding ring will elicit only one effective
bid for spectrum resources, which distorts the supply and demand of spectrum
resources and yields inefficient spectrum allocation. Further, in the extreme case
that all secondary users collude with each other, arbitrary low bid price will become
eligible. Thus, collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation is important for
efficient next generation wireless networking.
In the scenarios of traditional open ascending price, i.e., English auction (or
reverse English auction) [63], there is one seller and multiple buyers (or one buyer
and multiple sellers). In order to combat the bidding ring, the seller (or buyer)
can enhance their utilities by setting proper reserve prices as in [63] based on the
size of the bidding ring, i.e, the number of collusive users, and the statistics of
each user’s true value. However, in our scenarios of dynamic spectrum allocation
with multiple primary and secondary users having only local information, either
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the number of collusive users are not available or the determination of reserve
price becomes very complicated given limited imperfect information. Therefore,
how to design efficient collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation mechanisms
becomes an imminent and crucial task.
6.2 MSOP and OSMP Scenarios
In this part, we develop the robust dynamic spectrum allocation mechanisms
against user collusion in the scenarios of MSOP and OSMP. Note that the MSOP
scenarios may indicate the situations that several mobile users are competing for
the spectrum resources from the base station in cellular wireless systems; while
the OSMP scenarios may illustrate the situations that several network operators
or service providers are competing for offering spectrum services to the users. Now,
we study the MSOP scenarios first and similar analysis can be applied to OSMP
scenarios.
Consider there are one primary user and multiple secondary users in a snap
shot of wireless networks, which indicates that only one primary user pi is avail-
able for providing spectrum leasing services. The standard ascending price open
auction is chosen for the secondary users to compete for the spectrum resources,
which is theoretically equivalent to sealed-bid second-price auction [63]. Here, the
presence of user collusion among secondary users may generate extra utilities for
the collusive users by suppressing competition for spectrum resources. Due to the
network dynamics and imperfect available information, neither the primary user
can make a credible assumption about the presence of user collusion or the num-
ber of collusive users, nor there exist trust-worthy anti-cartel authorities in the
network. Therefore, the only instrument giving the primary user possible lever-
120
age against collusion is to set an optimal reserve price. In the rest of this part,
we first derive the theoretical optimal reserve price for our spectrum allocation
game similar to [63]. Then, by considering the properties of our spectrum alloca-
tion game such as unknown number of collusive users and imperfect/local bidding
information, a collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation mechanism is devel-
oped to efficiently allocate spectrum resources while combating collusive cheating
behaviors.
Specifically, we assume that K secondary users are divided into Kr bidding
rings and the size of the kth bidding ring is mk. Note that
∑Kr
k=1 mk = K, mk ≥ 1.
Basically, the collusion among the secondary users within each bidding ring does
not affect the strategies of users out of the bidding ring. Further, the bidding ring
can be represented by the collusive secondary user with the highest reward payoff
[63]. The other collusive users only submit non-serious bids at or below reserve
price, which substantially limits the competition among secondary users. Thus,
instead of K effective competing secondary users, only Kr effective users should be
considered for bidding spectrum resources. Assume the equivalent reward payoff
of the kth bidding ring is ν
aji
mk , the highest reward payoff among mk collusive users
for the aji th channel in the spectrum pool. Thus, the payoff vector for effective





2 , ..., ν
aji
Kr
}. Note that we omit the superscript aji
in the following parts for simplicity if the spectrum assignment is only considered
for one specific channel. Further, let the highest and second highest reward payoff
among all effective secondary users to be v(1) and v(2), respectively.
In order to combat the collusive behaviors of secondary users, the primary user
needs to set a reserve price, which means its spectrum resources won’t be sold lower
than the reserve price. Considering the theoretical equivalence of open ascending
121
price auction and second-price auction, we then study the optimal reserve price
for second-price auction setting in our spectrum allocation game. Let the optimal
reserve price to be φr,pi . Then, the spectrum channel can be leased by pi if and
only if v(1) > φr,pi . Moreover, if v(2) > φr,pi , the spectrum channel is leased for
v(2); otherwise, it is leased at the reserve price φr,pi . Let Fv(1)(x) and Fv(2)(x)
denote the cumulative density functions (CDF) of v(1) and v(2), respectively. Let
fv(1)(x) and fv(2)(x) denote the probability density functions (PDF) of v(1) and v(2),
respectively. Now, the expected utility gain of the primary user with reserve price




















Where M represents the largest possible vji . Note that the first term on the right
hand side (RHS) of (6.1) represents the utility when the spectrum channel is leased
at the reserve price. This happens if v(1) > φr,pi but v(2) < φr,pi . The second term
on the RHS of (6.1) represents the utility when v(2) ≥ φr,pi .
Assuming that an interior maximum exists for (6.1), the optimal reserve price









) = 0. (6.2)
Thus the optimal reserve price can be determined by the above (6.2) if the statis-
tical descriptions for v(1) and v(2) are available.
Similarly, in the scenarios of OSMP, if we let the lowest and second lowest
acquisition costs among all effective primary users be c(1) and c(2), respectively,
the expected utility gain of the secondary user si with reserve price φr,si by leasing
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Correspondingly, the first-order condition of (6.3) can be obtained as follows if an




)− Fc(1)(φ∗r,si) + (E[vji ]− φ∗r,si)fc(1)(φ∗r,si) = 0. (6.4)
However, in general scenarios of spectrum allocation, each user operates only
based on her/his local information and there may be no anti-cartel authorities.
Thus, the number of collusive users and the number of bidding rings are unknown to
each user. Consequently, even though the statistics of each user’s reward payoff is
available or can be estimated under homogeneous settings, the order statistics [78]
of v(2) and c(2) cannot be derived without the information of the number of collusive
users. Then, how to further obtain the optimal reserve prices considering the
constraints in our spectrum allocation game remains unanswered.
Since our pricing game belongs to the non-cooperation games with incomplete
information [10], the players need to build up certain beliefs of other players’ future
possible strategies to assist their decision making. In order to obtain the optimal
reserve prices from (6.2) and (6.4) for robust spectrum allocation, we first derive
the belief functions for primary and secondary users in the scenarios of MSOP and
OSMP, respectively. Similar to Chapter 5, we consider the primary/secondary
users’ beliefs as the ratio their bid/ask being accepted at different price levels as
in (5.11) and (5.12). The primary and secondary users’ beliefs, namely, r̃p(x) and
r̃s(y) cannot be practically obtained so that we need to further consider using the
historical bid/ask information to build up empirical belief values. In the scenarios
of MSOP, we have the following observations: if a bid ỹ > y is rejected, the bid at
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y will also be rejected; if a bid ỹ < y is accepted, the bid at y will also be accepted.
Based on the these observations, the secondary users’ beliefs can be further defined
as follows using the past bidding information.












1 y ≥ M
(6.5)
where ηR(w) is the number of bids at w that has been rejected, M is a large enough
value so that the bids greater than M will definitely be accepted. And, it is intuitive
that the bid at 0 will not be accepted by any primary users.
In the scenarios of OSMP, the primary users’ beliefs can be similarly derived
as follows using past ask information.












0 x ≥ M
(6.6)
where µR(w) is the number of asks at w that has been rejected. Also, it is intuitive
that the ask at 0 will be definitely accepted as no cost is introduced.
Noting that it is too costly to build up beliefs on every possible bid or ask
price, we can update the beliefs only at some fixed prices and use interpolation
to obtain the belief function over the price space. Considering the characteristics
of open ascending auction in the scenarios of MSOP, the secondary user with the
highest reward payoff doesn’t need to bid her/his true value to win the auction.
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In stead, she/he only needs to bid at the second highest possible payoff to have
all other secondary users drop out of the auction. Therefore, the secondary users’
belief function (6.5) actually represents the CDF of v(2). Similarly, the primary
users’ belief function (6.6) represents the CDF of c(2).
Further, since the total number of active secondary user and the statistics of the
reward payoff for each user are generally available, the PDF of v(1) in the scenarios











Therefore, the optimal reserve price for the primary user to combat user collusion in
the scenarios of MSOP can be obtained from (6.2) using (6.5) and (6.7). Moreover,
as for the scenarios of OSMP, the optimal reserve price for the secondary user can
be obtained from (6.4) using (6.6) and (6.8).
6.3 MSMP Scenarios
In the general scenarios of MSMP, efficient collusion-resistant spectrum allocation
needs to be carried out among multiple primary users and secondary users while
considering various user collusion patterns happening on both sides of spectrum
markets, which becomes highly complicated and difficult to be analyzed. In this
part, we will first derive a collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation mech-
anism for MSMP scenarios based on the results for the OSMP/MSOP scenarios.
Then, a lower bound is developed to measure the performance of the proposed
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mechanism by considering the extreme case of all-inclusive collusion within pri-
mary users and secondary users.
Before we derive the collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation mecha-
nism, let’s discuss several upcoming challenges due to MSMP scenarios. First, the
user collusion may happen not only within the primary users but also within the
secondary users. The outcomes of the spectrum allocation game are determined
by the collusive behaviors on both sides of the spectrum market. Second, the user
collusion highly distorts the true supply and demand of spectrum resources so that
the spectrum allocation efficiency will be deteriorated. It is because that except
the primary user with the lowest acquisition cost and the secondary user with
the highest reward payoff, the supply or demand of the spectrum resources from
other users in the bidding rings will no longer be elicited through bidding process.
Also, the dynamic nature of spectrum resources requires that the countermeasures
to the user collusion are able to easily adapt to the spectrum dynamics by using
only limited resources such as bandwidth of control channels or implementation
complexity.
Consider an important property of the bidding ring in our game settings that
the collusive behaviors within a bidding ring won’t affect the strategies of the users
who are not in the bidding ring. It means that, for instance, a primary user’s opti-
mal reserve price is only determined by the spectrum demand statistics and won’t
be affected by the collusive behaviors of other primary users. Similar arguments
can be applied to the secondary users. Therefore, an efficient collusion-resistant
dynamic spectrum allocation approach in MSMP scenarios can be similarly derived
based on the results of the above discussion on the scenarios of OSMP and MSOP.
First, the definition of the beliefs of primary users and secondary users need
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to be redefined according to the characteristics of double auction. We have the
following new observations in the scenarios of MSMP:
• If a bid ỹ > x is made, the ask at x will also be accepted;
• If an ask x̃ < y is made, the bid at y will also be accepted.
Based on the above observations, the users’ beliefs in the scenarios of MSMP
can be further refined as follows using the past bid/ask information. Note that
Definition 5.4.1 for the primary users and Definition 5.4.2 for the secondary users
r̂p(x) and r̂s(x), respectively, in Chapter 5 can also be applied here. By using
these belief functions and the order statistics of v(1) and c(1) given the number of
active primary and secondary users, the optimal reserve price for the primary user





Similarly, after applying the Spread Reduction Rule of double auction, we use
the belief function r̄p(x) from Chapter 5. Considering the optimal reserve price





where Upi(x, j) represents the payoff introduced by allocating the jth channel when
the ask is x, and then E[Upi(x, j)] = (x−cji )· r̄p(x), x > φ∗r,pi . Similarly, considering
the optimal reserve price φ∗r,si for the secondary user si, the payoff maximization




where Usi(y, j) represents the payoff introduced by leasing the jth channel in the
spectrum pool when the bid is y, and then E[Usi(y, j)] = (v
j
i − y) · r̄s(y), y <
127
Table 6.1: Collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation
1. Initialize the users’ beliefs and bids/asks
¦ The primary users initialize their asks as large values close to M
and their beliefs as small positive values less than 1;
¦ The secondary users initialize their bids as small values close to 0
and their beliefs as small positive values less than 1.
2. Belief update based on local information:
Update primary and secondary users’ beliefs
using (5.13) and (5.14), respectively
3. Optimal reserve price for primary and secondary users:
Update primary users’ optimal reserve prices φ∗r,pi using (6.2), (6.7) and (5.13);
Update secondary users’ optimal reserve prices φ∗r,si using (6.4), (6.8) and (5.14).
4. Optimal bid/ask update:
¦ Obtain the optimal ask for each primary user by solving (6.9) given φ∗r,pi ;
¦ Obtain the optimal bid for each secondary user by solving (6.10) given φ∗r,si .
5. Update leasing agreement and spectrum pool:
¦ If the outstanding bid is greater than or equal to the outstanding ask,
the leasing agreement will be signed between the corresponding users;
¦ Update the spectrum pool by removing the assigned channel.
6. Iteration:
If the spectrum pool is not empty, go back to Step 2.
φ∗r,si . Therefore, by solving the optimization problem for each effective primary
and secondary users using (6.9) and (6.10), respectively, the optimal decisions of
spectrum allocation at every stage can be made conditional on dynamic spectrum
demand and supply. Note that when a leasing agreement for one specific spectrum
channel is achieved for a pair of primary and secondary users, the order statistics of
v(1) and c(1) need to be updated as well as the optimal reserve prices for achieving
the next leasing agreement. Based on the above discussions, we illustrate our
collusion-resistant dynamic pricing algorithm for spectrum allocation in Table 6.1.
In order to measure the performance of the proposed collusion-resistant dy-
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namic spectrum allocation mechanism, we derive its performance lower bound
with the presence of user collusion in the following parts.
An efficient spectrum allocation scheme can be achieved by balancing the sup-
ply and demand of spectrum resources as shown in Chapter 5. Thus, it is straight-
forward that the most inefficient spectrum allocation occurs when all the supply
and demand information are concealed by the collusive behaviors of selfish users,
which happens when two all-inclusive collusion are formed among the primary
users and secondary users, respectively. Under this situation, the spectrum al-
location game becomes a bargaining game between two players, i.e, the primary
user p(1) with lowest acquisition cost c(1) and the secondary user s(1) with highest
reward payoff v(1). By studying this extreme case, the lower bound of the proposed
collusion-resistant scheme can be obtained.
Generally speaking, the primary user p(1) and secondary user s(1) value a spec-
trum channel differently so that a surplus is created. The objective of the bar-
gaining game is to determine in which way the primary and secondary users agree
to divide the surplus. Considering our bargaining game only involves two players,
assume the minimal utilities that the users may obtain during the bargaining pro-
cess to be Up(1) and U s(1) for user p(1) and s(1), respectively. Let U = {Up(1) , U s(1)}.
Assume S to be a closed and convex subset of R2, which represents the set of fea-
sible utilities that the users can achieve if they cooperate with each other. Thus,
our bargaining game between primary user p(1) and secondary user s(1) can be
represented by (s,U). Moreover, assume a bargaining solution to (s,U) to be rep-
resented as ϕ(s,U) = (U bp(1) , U
b
s(1)
). Among all possible bargaining outcomes, the
Nash Bargaining Solution [9] provides a unique and fair Pareto optimal out-
come considering that the bargaining solution satisfies the following six axioms.
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• Individual Rationality: (U bp(1) , U bs(1)) ≥ (Up(1) , U s(1));
• Feasibility: (U bp(1) , U bs(1)) ∈ S;
• Pareto Optimality: If (Up, Us) ∈ S, and (Up, Us) ≥ (U bp(1) , U bs(1)), then




• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If (U bp(1) , U bs(1)) ∈ S̃ ⊂ S, and
(U bp(1) , U
b
s(1)




• Independence of Linear Transformations: For any linear transforma-




• Symmetry: If S is invariant under all exchanges of agents and Up(1) = U s(1) ,




Noting that the above axioms are generally true for our bargaining game (s,U),
the corresponding Nash Bargaining Solution can be represented as follows.
max
φb
Ec(1),v(1) [Up(1)(φb, c(1)) · Us(1)(φb, v(1))] (6.11)
s.t. G(Up(1) , Us(1)) ≤ Ũ , (6.12)
Up(1) , Us(1) ≥ 0, (6.13)
where Up(1)(φb, c(1)) = φb−c(1) and Us(1)(φb, v(1)) = v(1)−φb . The two constraints give
the feasible sets of Up(1) and Us(1) . Note that based on the definition of linear utility
functions for the users, the constraint (6.12) can be simplified as Up(1) + Us(1) ≤
v(1) − c(1). Therefore, the lower bound of the spectrum efficiency in the presence
of user collusion can be obtained by solving (6.11). Moreover, after a leasing
agreement is achieved between a primary user and a secondary user, the spectrum
allocation continues by solving (6.11) with updated statistics of v(1) and c(1).
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Competitive Equilibrium without user collusion
Dynamic pricing without reserve prices when no collusion
Nash Bargaining Solution with all−inclusive collusion
The proposed scheme with 25% colluders
The proposed scheme with 80% colluders
Pricing without reserve prices when 80% colluders
Figure 6.3: Comparison of the total utilities of the CE, pricing scheme without
reserve prices, and the proposed scheme with different user collusion.
6.4 Simulation Studies
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed belief-assisted dynamic
spectrum sharing approach in wireless networks with user collusion. The simulation
setup is the same as in Chapter 5
In Figure 6.3, we compare the total utilities of the competitive equilibrium,
our dynamic pricing scheme with reserve prices, and our dynamic pricing scheme
without reserve prices under various situations of user collusion. It can be seen
from the figure that when there is no user collusion, the dynamic pricing scheme
without reserve prices is able to achieve similar performance compared to the the-
oretical CE outcomes. Moreover, with the presence of user collusion, the proposed
scheme with reserves prices achieves much higher total utilities than those of the
scheme without reserve prices. Note that the total utilities increase when the num-
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ber of secondary users increases. It is because that the competition among more
secondary users helps to increase the spectrum efficiency. However, under the sce-
narios of user collusion, the performance gap between the proposed scheme with
reserve price and the CE becomes greater when the number of secondary users
increases. The reason is that the proposed scheme with reserve prices needs to set
more strict reserve prices to combat severe user collusion when there are more sec-
ondary users. Further, the lower bound of the proposed collusion-resistant scheme
shown in Figure 6.3 provides an efficient measurement for the maximal possible
performance loss due to user collusion.
Now we study the overhead of the proposed scheme using the average number
of bids and asks for each stage. In Figure 6.4, the overheads of the proposed scheme
with or without reserve prices are compared to those of the traditional continu-
ous double auction when the same total utility is achieved. Assume the minimal
bid/ask step δ of the continuous double auction to be 0.01. It can be seen from
the figure that our approach substantially decreases the pricing communication
overhead under either the situations with user collusion or without user collusion.
Note that while decreasing the overhead, our proposed approach may introduce
extra complexity to update the beliefs and optimal reserve prices.
Then, we study the effect of user collusion for dynamic spectrum allocation
when each secondary user is constrained by his/her monetary budget like we discuss
in Chapter 5. For comparison, we define a static scheme in which the secondary
users make their spectrum-leasing decisions without considering their budget lim-
its. Without loss of generality, we assume that the budget constraints for all sec-
ondary users are the same. By applying our proposed scheme with reserve prices to
the dynamic programming approach in [42] considering budget constraints, we are
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The proposed scheme when no collusion
Continuous double auction δ=0.01
The proposed scheme with 25% colluders
Continuous double auction with 25% colluders
Figure 6.4: Comparison of the overhead between the proposed scheme and contin-
uous double auction scheme.






















Dynamic pricing with 80% user collusion
Dynamic pricing without user collusion
Static scheme without user collusion
Static scheme with 80% user collusion
Figure 6.5: Comparison of the total utilities of the proposed scheme with those of
the static scheme.
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able to similarly obtain the performance of the proposed collusion-resistant scheme
when optimal spectrum allocation needs to be considered over time. In Figure 6.5,
we compare the total utilities of our proposed scheme with those of the static
scheme for different budget constraints when the user collusion is present. Note
that the proposed collusion-resistant scheme is applied to both dynamic and static
pricing considering budget constraints. It can be seen from the figure that with the
presence of user collusion, our proposed scheme with reserve prices achieves sig-
nificant performance gains over the static scheme when the budget constraints are
taken into consideration. That’s because the performance loss due to the setting
of reserve prices can be partly offset by exploiting the time diversity of spectrum
resources.
6.5 Summary
Dynamic spectrum allocation is promising for enhancing the spectrum efficiency for
wireless networks. However, user collusion among selfish users severely deteriorates
the efficiency of spectrum sharing. In this chapter, we model the dynamic spectrum
allocation as a multi-stage pricing game and propose a collusion-resistant dynamic
pricing approach to maximize the users’ utilities while combating their collusive
behaviors using the derived optimal reserve prices. Further, the lower bound of the
proposed scheme is analyzed using Nash Bargaining Solution. Simulation results
show that the proposed scheme can achieve high spectrum efficiency by only using
limited overhead under various situations of user collusion.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation we have carried out the game theoretical analysis of cooperation
in autonomous wireless networks. We focus on studying the impact of imperfect
observation, networks dynamics and collusive behaviors on the efficient and robust
game theoretical design of cooperation formation and evolvement among the selfish
users in autonomous wireless networks.
First, we have studied the cooperation enforcement in autonomous wireless net-
works under noise and imperfect information. Most existing works on cooperation
in autonomous wireless networks assume perfect or complete information for each
network user. In this dissertation, we study the cooperation in a game theoretical
framework and propose a set of belief-assisted or pricing-based approaches to en-
sure cooperation among selfish users under various network scenarios. With the aid
of the belief system or pricing interactions, the network users are able to infer other
users’ private information through their observed imperfect information. There-
fore, efficient cooperation can be achieved among selfish users in wireless networks
under noise and imperfect information. Specifically, in autonomous MANETs,
the belief-based packet forwarding approach is proposed to stimulate the packet
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forwarding between the network nodes only based on the privately observed imper-
fect information at each node. In autonomous DSANs, we propose a belief-assisted
approach to achieve efficient dynamic spectrum sharing among primary and sec-
ondary users based on double auction rules. The network users build up its belief
on spectrum demand and supply using their observed local bidding information,
which assists them to make optimal decisions on the corresponding pricing actions.
Second, we have investigated the effect of network dynamics on game theoretical
cooperation stimulation/enforcement in autonomous wireless networks. In order
to have efficient cooperation in dynamic networks scenarios, not only the current
moves of network users but also the past moves need to be taken into consideration
for developing efficient distributive game theoretical mechanisms. The impact of
network dynamics such as mobility, wireless channel fading, or network traffic vari-
ations on the users’ behaviors also needs to be incorporated. In this dissertation,
we model the interaction among users as multi-stage dynamic games and study the
effect of reputation and retribution in long-run scenarios. We propose an optimal
dynamic pricing approach to dynamically maximize the sender/receiver’ payoffs
over multiple routing stages considering the dynamic nature of MANETs, mean-
while, keeping the forwarding incentives of the relay nodes by optimally pricing
their packet-forwarding actions. For DSANs, by modeling the spectrum sharing
as a dynamic pricing game, we propose a distributed pricing approach to optimize
the spectrum allocation based on the double auction rules.
Third, we have further investigated the collusive selfish behaviors in autonomous
wireless networks in a non-cooperative game theoretical framework. Although the
selfish behaviors of individual network users have been studied to ensure coopera-
tion, the collusive selfish behaviors from multiple selfish users have not been fully
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exploited. In this dissertation, we analyze the collusive behaviors in auction-based
cooperation stimulation scenarios and propose a collusion-resistant dynamic pric-
ing mechanism with optimal reserve prices designed to combat or alleviate collusive
behaviors. Moreover, the performance bounds of the autonomous networks with
collusive users are also derived by using appropriate equilibrium concepts from
game theory.
Although in this dissertation we have thoroughly addressed several critical is-
sues in the game theoretical framework for cooperation in autonomous wireless
networks, there still exist many issues that need further investigation. In the fol-
lowing of this chapter, we will discuss several avenues for future research.
The first issue we would like to address is about the belief/trust propagation
in autonomous wireless networks. In previous chapters, we have studied belief
formation in various network scenarios, which helps the selfish users to make op-
timal decisions of their future moves based on others’ behaviorial history. As
we have discussed, the network users in autonomous wireless networks may only
have incomplete and imperfect information of others’ actions and strategy spaces.
Therefore, in order to have efficient cooperation through a entire autonomous net-
work, the network users should be able to update their beliefs/trusts based upon
the reputation propagation involving multiple network users. Our focus will be on
studying the belief/trust propagation using Bayesian game models and deriving
formal game theoretical approaches for the belief/trust built-up, update, propa-
gation and evaluation. Moreover, we would like to incorporate the characteristics
of different autonomous wireless networks while developing the belief propagation
systems. We will also be interested in analyzing the optimality of the derived be-
lief propagation systems using well-defined equilibrium criteria from the dynamic
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game theory.
In this dissertation, we focus our efforts on selfish behaviors of network users
and cooperation stimulation/enforcement among them in autonomous wireless net-
works. The impacts of the malicious users on autonomous wireless networks need
to be further considered and studied. Different from selfish users, the malicious
users aim to cause as much damage to the networks as possible. They are also in-
telligent and even launching attacks in a coordinated way. In order to have robust
autonomous wireless networks, not only the attacks on traditional network func-
tionalities should be considered, but also the attacks on the cooperation paradigms
or belief systems must be combatted. Further, considering the scenarios that var-
ious types of users coexist including cooperative users, selfish users and malicious
users, the game theoretical study requires comprehensive understanding of con-
flicts and cooperation among different types of users. We would like to investigate
the game models incorporating various types of users for autonomous networks and
devise efficient mechanisms to maximize the system performance while limiting the
damage caused by malicious users.
As we mentioned before, smart wireless devices such as cognitive radios enable
more intelligent actions at network users equipped with those devices. For example,
cognitive radios provide the wireless users with various cognitive capabilities such
as frequency agility, adaptive modulation, transmit power control and scheduling
management. More importantly, the cognitive engine in a cognitive radio is able
to make intelligent decisions based on the observed information. In our future
work, we would like to investigate our game theoretical approaches for autonomous
wireless networks by considering the ability of cognitive radios and the cognitive
interactions between the wireless environments and radio devices. Note that there
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are powerful open-source cognitive radio softwares such as GNU Radio [84] and
OSSIE [85] as well as flexible FPGA-based hardware platforms such as USRP
boards [86], which make it possible for the network users to intelligently configure
its communication parameters in software. Therefore, by studying game theoretical
cooperation stimulation/enforcement on the cognitive radio platforms in practical
wireless environments, we will be able to develop practical network protocols for
different applications of autonomous wireless networks based upon the theoretical
approaches and corresponding field results.
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